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CRIMINAL LAW x ADDICTION* 
DAWINDER S. SIDHU** 
When an individual with an addiction commits an unlawful act that is 
symptomatic of the disorder, is the act involuntary and therefore beyond the 
reach of criminal law? The federal circuit courts are divided on this question. 
The majority view posits that an individual may be held criminally responsible 
for all unlawful acts, regardless of whether the acts are symptomatic of the 
disease of addiction. The en banc Fourth Circuit recently broke from these 
circuits, suggesting instead that an act that is symptomatic of the disease of 
addiction is involuntary and cannot be punished. 
Both models are flawed. The first approach (the binary status-conduct 
distinction) asks only whether the individual committed an identifiable act. 
But this approach ignores the conditions under which the defendant drank or 
used and withdraws from the defendant the opportunity to make a showing of 
involuntariness based on their specific circumstances. For its part, the second 
approach (the categorical-involuntary model) accepts conclusory 
representations that the disease of addiction negates choice, without probing to 
any degree whether these representations are supported by any facts. 
Therefore, a third model is necessary. 
This Article proposes that new paradigm. It argues that courts should engage in 
meaningful individualized inquiries as to the voluntary or involuntary nature 
of the acts in question. Drawing on medical information, formal treatment 
programs, twelve-step fellowship programs, and the related disability context, 
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this Article defines that fact-specific process, guiding courts and practitioners as 
to what such an individualized showing would entail. This prudent, case-by-
case approach would best respect the unique circumstances of the individual 
facing criminal sanction as well as our fluid, evolving understanding of 
addiction itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Criminal law may be likened to the outer limits of acceptable behavior in 
American society. Only when an individual crosses the line and does so 
voluntarily may the individual be subject to criminal punishment.1 As stated 
by the prominent jurist E. Barrett Prettyman, a “basic” axiom of criminal law 
is that if a person “is not a free agent, or not making a choice, or . . . not acting 
freely,” that person “is outside the postulate of the law of punishment.”2 
This Article addresses the application of this foundational principle to 
addiction.3 It specifically explores whether an act that is symptomatic of the 
 
 1. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 206 (3d ed. 2000) (“A bodily movement, to 
qualify as an act forming the basis of criminal liability, must be voluntary.”). 
 2. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
 3. “Addiction” generally refers to the chronic use of drugs or alcohol notwithstanding the 
adverse consequences of such use. See Substance Abuse and Addiction Information, UNIV. TENN. 
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disease of addiction may be deemed compelled by the disease and therefore 
involuntary for purposes of criminal law. Consider an individual who is 
addicted to heroin during the opioid crisis.4 Assume further that this person 
has overdosed from heroin use and been revived by emergency responders 
multiple times.5 Can it be a crime for this person to be a known or habitual 
user of heroin? Can it be a crime for this person to use heroin? What if the 
person used heroin to avoid acute withdrawal symptoms, including anxiety, 
vomiting, and loss of bowel control?6 
The federal circuit courts are divided on these questions. The primary 
reason for the split is that the courts diverge as to the proper interpretation of 
two Supreme Court opinions from the 1960s—the last time the Court 
squarely addressed the intersection of criminal law and addiction.7 A majority 
of circuits posit that an individual with an addiction can be held criminally 
responsible for their acts, regardless of whether the relevant acts are 
symptomatic of an addiction.8 Under this status-conduct formulation, the 
individual may be held criminally liable in the second (an individual who uses 
heroin) and third (an individual who uses to avert severe withdrawal 
symptoms) scenarios provided above because they both contain an actus reus. 
The en banc Fourth Circuit recently broke from its sister circuits, suggesting 
instead that actions symptomatic of the disease of addiction are nonvolitional 
and therefore beyond the reach of the criminal law.9 Under this rule, the 
individual with an addiction cannot be held criminally responsible in any of 
the aforementioned situations because any actions are involuntary on account 
of the disease of addiction. The difference in principle thus produces different 
legal outcomes. 
 
HEALTH SCI. CTR., https://uthsc.edu/comc/well-being/substance-abuse-information-chattanooga 
.php [https://perma.cc/CXC7-XTHV] (last updated Sept. 28, 2020) (“Addiction is a complex 
condition, a brain disease that is manifested by compulsive substance use despite harmful 
consequence. People with addiction . . . keep using alcohol or a drug even when they know it will 
cause problems.”). While “alcohol use disorder” and “substance use disorder” are the preferred terms 
in clinical settings, see infra Section I.C, this Article elects to use the lay terminology of “addiction.” 
 4. For an excellent overview of the development of the opioid epidemic in the United States, 
see generally BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY THAT 
ADDICTED AMERICA (2018). 
 5. This is not uncommon. See, e.g., Kate Ryan, Montgomery Co. Sees Slight Drop in Opioid 
Overdose Deaths, WTOP (Oct. 18, 2019, 3:50 PM), http://wtop.com/montgomery-county/2019/ 
10/montgomery-county-sees-slight-drop-in-opioid-overdose-deaths [https://perma.cc/5LQT-ETVW] 
(sharing the story of a woman, now in recovery, who overdosed eighteen times). 
 6. Jeffery Juergens, Heroin Withdrawal and Detox, ADDICTION CTR. (Dec. 2, 2020), 
https://www.addictioncenter.com/drugs/heroin/withdrawal-detox/ [https://perma.cc/QD4U-SUET]. 
 7. See infra Section II.B.  
 8. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 9. See infra Section II.C.2.  
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Both models are flawed. The first approach—which focuses only on 
whether the criminal punishment follows some actus reus10—prevents the 
individual with an addiction to alcohol or drugs11 from being able to make an 
evidentiary showing that their specific circumstances precluded their ability to 
comply with the law.12 At the same time, the second approach—which asks 
only whether the defendant possesses an addiction—ignores the general 
capacity of the individual with an addiction to exercise choice and therefore 
absolves the individual of criminal responsibility without probing whether 
individual circumstances prevented the individual from addressing their 
addiction and its adverse manifestations.13 
A new model is needed. This Article argues that courts should engage in 
meaningful individualized inquiries as to the voluntary or involuntary nature 
of the acts in question.14 This Article draws on medical information, formal 
treatment programs, twelve-step fellowship programs, and the related 
disability context to define this process and to guide judges and practitioners 
as to what such an individualized showing would entail. This prudent, case-
by-case approach would best respect the unique circumstances of the 
individual facing criminal sanction as well as our evolving understanding of 
addiction itself. 
This Article begins by establishing a historical and conceptual baseline 
for the discussion of the three competing models. Part I of this Article 
specifically offers an overview of the early understanding of addiction in the 
United States; explains the prevailing disease model of addiction; and 
addresses how addiction is currently treated, covering both formal 
rehabilitation programs and more peer-led twelve-step fellowship programs. 
Building on this foundation, Part II turns to law, noting how issues 
implicating addiction have arisen in the criminal law concepts of intoxication 
and insanity. Part II then summarizes Robinson v. California15 and Powell v. 
 
 10. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (“In the criminal law, both a 
culpable mens rea and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur.”). The 
former corresponds with “an evil-meaning mind” and the latter with “an evil-doing hand.” Morissette 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952). 
 11. This Article uses the term “individual with alcohol or drug disease” and variations thereof. 
With the exception of quotes from court opinions and others, this Article avoids “addict” and 
variations thereof, in consideration of guidance on appropriate terminology in the addiction context. 
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS: A GUIDE TO THE USE OF LANGUAGE 12 (2004) [hereinafter 
SAMHSA], http://www.naabt.org/documents/Languageofaddictionmedicine.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E394-GGFY]. This Article also focuses on the possible criminal liability of an individual with alcohol 
or substance use disorder. It does not address other forms of addiction. 
 12. See infra Section III.A.  
 13. See infra Section III.B.  
 14. See infra Section III.C.  
 15. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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Texas16—the Supreme Court’s last two major pronouncements on criminal law 
and addiction—and identifies the two interpretive camps that have emerged 
from these twin opinions. Part III argues that these two approaches are 
contrary to scientific information on addiction, contrary to treatment models, 
and even contrary to the comparable legal regime governing disability. This 
Article then makes the case for the third, evidentiary model as the most 
clinically and legally defensible means by which to analyze when the disease of 
addiction renders an act involuntary for purposes of criminal law. Part IV 
concludes. 
Courts, commentators, litigants, and the public have struggled to 
identify the proper relationship between criminal law and addiction, 
particularly because the subject of addiction implicates complex and 
controversial considerations of medicine, morality, and social attitudes. 17 
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in this area of criminal law, more 
definitive guidance for courts and others is critically necessary. The Supreme 
Court last addressed criminal law and addiction in the 1960s.18 In 2019, an en 
banc Fourth Circuit split 8–7 on the meaning and applicability of those 
cases.19 The fair administration of criminal justice is undermined by such 
substantive uncertainty and disparity. This Article aims to provide that much-
needed conceptual clarity, translating medical and treatment information into 
optimal legal rules, thereby giving courts and litigants a more durable and 
sound process by which to adjudicate questions of criminal responsibility and 
addiction. 20  As the nation remains in the throes of an opioid crisis, 
determining whether and when individuals with an addiction to drugs or 
 
 16. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 17. For example, consider a recent exchange, which played out in the pages of The Baltimore 
Sun, on whether and when the criminal justice system should intersect with addiction. See George 
Hammerbacher, Should Police Look the Other Way When Addicts Steal?, BALT. SUN (Nov. 
24,  2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/readers-respond/bs-ed-rr-drug-decriminalization-
letter-20201124-uvl7sw4dkzcc3jgvoek5lribme-story.html [https://perma.cc/8J4P-DWHS (dark 
archive)]; Dale Klatzker, Opinion, Gaudenzia: Partnering with Justice System Necessary for Effective 
Addiction Treatment, BALT. SUN (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-
ed-op-1109-gaudenzia-treatment-20201106-heurk4unynh5db7mgoli76od7i-story.html [https://perma 
.cc/Q2M9-FZW3 (dark archive)]; Brendan Saloner, Letter to the Editor, Drug Treatment Works Better 
Without Police Involvement, BALT. SUN (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/ 
opinion/readers-respond/bs-ed-rr-drug-treatment-police-letter-20201118-6ffvyhfjqveqziibqusznwl6ka 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/MVR2-F7VT (dark archive)]. 
 18. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660; Powell, 392 U.S. at 514–15. 
 19. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 20. This Article addresses only the threshold question of whether criminal liability is 
appropriate for conduct symptomatic of addiction and not the second-order issue of the form and 
length of the resulting punishment. As a preliminary matter, however, punishment that serves 
rehabilitative purpose would be the most sensible and defensible to help the individual better address 
the manifestations of their disease, reduce the prospects for recidivism, and yet ensure that the 
individual meets some consequences for stepping over the lines of the law. 
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alcohol may face criminal penalties (and associated collateral consequences) 
for symptomatic conduct cannot wait and matters in real terms. 
I. WHAT IS ADDICTION: HISTORY, DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT 
This part addresses the basics of addiction. First, it describes how 
addiction has been conceptualized historically, tracing attempts to understand 
addiction in early America through Prohibition. Second, it discusses the 
current, prevailing disease model of addiction, summarizing how alcohol and 
drugs affect the brain and noting criticisms of the disease model. Third, it 
explores how addiction is treated, sketching formal clinical options and peer-
based twelve-step fellowship programs. 
A. Historical Understanding 
Intoxicants occupy a complicated space in American history and society. 
In general, that history suggests generally permissive attitudes towards heavy 
consumption of alcohol, accompanied by attempts to address excessive 
drinking and its harms. In colonial and early America, “[m]ost of the 
population, from youth to old age, consumed [alcohol], often at every meal, 
from breakfast through supper.”21 In 1790, “an average American over fifteen 
years old drank just under six gallons of absolute alcohol each year.”22 This 
amount rose to over seven gallons in 1810.23 The trend continued. “[I]n the 
1820’s the typical American man was putting away half a pint of [corn 
whiskey] every day.”24 “[D]uring the first decades of the 19th century . . . 
Americans [went] on a collective bender that confronted the young republic 
with its first major public-health crisis . . . .”25 
Noteworthy figures in the founding generation shared the general 
public’s taste for alcohol. Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, purchased 
two 126-gallon casks of madeira per year.26 Benjamin Franklin rather famously 
 
 21. Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First 
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 899, 914 (2005) (quoting Richard F. Hamm, 
Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: Unintended Consequences of the Eighteenth and Twenty-first 
Amendments, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 164, 166 
(David E. Kyvig ed., 2000)). 
 22. MARK EDWARD LENDER & JAMES KIRBY MARTIN, DRINKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 
14 (1982). 
 23. Id. at 46. 
 24. Lucas, supra note 21, at 915 (quoting Michael Pollan, The (Agri)Cultural Contradictions of 
Obesity, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 12, 2003, at 41, 42). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Jean Edward Smith, Sallie E. Marshall Hardy’s ‘John Marshall’, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 309, 310 
(2000). Other Justices are known to have enjoyed alcohol. Justice Thurgood Marshall, for example, 
drank bourbon. See Elena Kagan, For Justice Marshall, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1126–27 (1993). Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s favorite lunch apparently consisted of a cheeseburger and beer. See Michael Q. 
Eagan, Chief Justice Rehnquist: Soft Shoes Below the Bench, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 1986), https:// 
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remarked that wine was “proof that God loves us.”27 John Adams drank hard 
cider before breakfast.28 To be fair, some framers voiced concerns related to 
alcohol as well. James Madison claimed that liquor was “inconsistent with the 
purity of moral and republican principles.”29 Adams became “so concerned 
about the level of drunkenness that he proposed limiting the number of 
taverns . . . .” 30  Even Franklin concurred, calling taverns a “[p]est to 
Society.”31 
The English, the colonies, and then the states prohibited drunkenness, 
showing little regard for those who overindulged.32 The English effort to 
regulate intoxicating substances stretches back to at least 1606, in the form of a 
statute that condemned “the loathsom and odious sin of drunkenness,” “the 
root and foundation of many other enormous sins, as bloodshed, stabbing, 
 
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-06-22-op-20810-story.html [https://perma.cc/S3A6-8Y8Y 
(dark archive)]. Justice Brett Kavanaugh has professed his love of beer. See Frank Bruni, Opinion, 
Brett Kavanaugh Loves His Beer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
09/29/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-beer-politics.html [https://perma.cc/ZPJ3-M3BM (dark archive)]. 
Justices’ relationships with alcohol are not all positive. Justice Thurgood Marshall’s father was an 
alcoholic, David J. Garrow, The Symbolic Justice, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1998, at 42, 42 (book 
review), as was Justice Sotomayor’s father, SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 25 (2013). 
Justice Clarence Thomas recounts his own heavy drinking. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Clarence 
Thomas: A Silent Justice Speaks Out, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2007, 4:29 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
TheLaw/story?id=3664638 [https://perma.cc/E7NM-5G2P]. Justice William O. Douglas was known 
to be an alcoholic. Then-Judge Posner blasted Justice Douglas for his “heavy drinking” and other 
attributes, calling him “one of the most unwholesome figures in modern American political 
history . . . .” Richard A. Posner, The Anti-Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, 27, 27 (book 
review). Though not a justice, U.S. District Judge John Pickering was impeached and removed from 
office in large part because of his drinking. See NANCY MAVEETY, GLASS AND GAVEL: THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT AND ALCOHOL 12 (2019). 
 27. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2476–77 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 28. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 36 (2001). 
 29. LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 22, at 39; see also Letter from George Washington to 
Thomas Green (Mar. 31, 1789), in From George Washington to Thomas Green, 31 March 1789, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-01-02-
0364 [https://perma.cc/SK68-RB99] (writing that “drink . . . is the source of all evil—and the ruin of 
half the workmen in this Country”).  
 30. Harry Gene Levine, The Discovery of Addiction: Changing Conceptions of Habitual Drunkenness 
in America, 2 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 43, 44 (1985). 
 31. Id. at 145. For an informative discussion of widespread alcohol use during the founding 
period, see Alan Taylor, Alcohol Use in the Early American Republic, C-SPAN (Mar. 5, 
2014),  https://www.c-span.org/video/?317982-1/lecture-early-us-alcohol-consumption [https://perma 
.cc/47JY-5NZ3]. 
 32. The distaste of alcohol extends back millennia, prior to the existence of the Anglo-American 
legal tradition. See Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 853 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(“Who hath woe? who hath sorrow? who hath contentions? who hath babbling? who hath wounds 
without cause? who hath redness of eyes? They that tarry long at the wine; they that go to seek mixed 
wine.” (quoting Proverbs 23:29–30)). 
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murder, swearing, fornication, adultery, and such like.”33 Similarly, New York 
laws of 1665–1675 forbade those “overtaken with Drink.” 34  Comparable 
statutes were enacted in early America. 35  Punishments in this era for 
violations of such laws included whippings and the stocks.36 
Such statutes reflected the prevailing moral opprobrium attached to 
individuals deemed to be “drunkards.” The same statutes prohibiting excessive 
drinking also applied to “vagrant persons,” lying, gambling, prostitution, 
witchcraft, cock-fighting, and profane cursing.37 Fueling the negative social 
perception of the “drunkard” was the general sense that excessive drinking was 
a product of an individual’s choice and thus the proper subject of social 
judgment and legal punishment. In 1754, for example, Jonathan Edwards 
wrote that the desire of the “drunkard” to drink cannot be attributed to 
anything other than “choice” or “election.”38 Edwards rejected the argument 
that the “drunkard” is unable to stop drinking: “It cannot be truly said . . . that 
a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his 
mouth.”39 
One chief exception to the general view that drunkenness represented a 
choice appears in the writings of Dr. Benjamin Rush, who served as Surgeon 
General of the Continental Army, signed the Declaration of Independence, 
and worked as a physician and professor.40 Rush appreciated the powerful 
hold that addiction had on the individual. He recounted the words of an 
individual addicted to alcohol: “Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room, 
and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not 
refrain from passing before that cannon, in order to get at the rum.”41 Rush 
claimed that, while “[t]he use of strong drink is at first the effect of free 
 
 33. Jayesh M. Rathod, Distilling Americans: The Legacy of Prohibition on U.S. Immigration Law, 51 
HOUS. L. REV. 781, 792 n.55 (2014) (citing (1606) 4 Jacob’s Ch Rep. I, c. 5 (Eng.) (third alteration 
in original)).  
 34. EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NEW YORK, 1665–1693, at 133 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978). 
 35. FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 23 (John D. Cushing ed., 1982) 
(authorizing arrest for those “guilty of Drunkenness”); COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 139 
(1889) (permitting punishment of those “overtaken with drink”); DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF NEW 
JERSEY, 1709–1861, at 896 (Lucius Q.C. Elmer ed., 1861) (labeling “common drunkards” as 
“disorderly persons”); 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1700–1810, at 178 
(1810) (making any person who engages in “excessive drinking of spiritous, vinous, or other strong 
liquors” subject to conviction). 
 36. Levine, supra note 30, at 44. 
 37. See, e.g., FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, supra note 35, at 23; COLONIAL 
LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 35, at 139; DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF NEW JERSEY, supra 
note 35, at 896; LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 35, at 177–83. 
 38. JOHNATHAN EDWARDS, FREEDOM OF THE WILL 10, 231 (1754). 
 39. Id. at 37. 
 40. Dr. Benjamin Rush: Father of American Psychiatry, PENN MED., https://www.uphs.upenn.edu/ 
paharc/timeline/1751/tline7.html [https://perma.cc/YF7E-WVT6]. 
 41. BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS, UPON THE DISEASE OF 
THE MIND 266 (1812). 
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agency,” habitual drinking “takes place from necessity.” 42  At this point, 
drinking is no longer an act of free will but rather the product of a “disease of 
the will,” he concluded.43 
Rush’s writings, prescient from today’s vantage point, occupied a 
minority position during his time. The dominant approach was grounded in 
concerns about the immorality of drunkenness and the social harms stemming 
from it. 44 A series of cases from the late nineteenth century reflect the 
majority view. In them, the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that states 
could regulate alcohol under their police powers, as alcohol implicates 
governmental interests in health, safety, and morality.45 Echoing the 1606 
English statute, the Supreme Court in 1887 confessed that “we cannot shut 
out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the 
public morals, and the public safety, may be endangered by the general use of 
intoxicating drinks . . . .”46 “[N]or [can we ignore] the fact, established by 
statistics accessible to every one, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and 
crime existing in the country are, in some degree at least, traceable to this 
evil,” the Court continued.47 
Abraham Lincoln himself entered the fray. Addressing temperance 
advocates, he stated, “[T]he practice of drinking [intoxicating beverages] is 
just as old as the world itself . . . .”48 “When all such of us, as have now 
reached the years of maturity, . . . we found intoxicating liquor, recognized by 
everybody, used by every body, and repudiated by nobody,” he added.49 It is 
true, Lincoln acknowledged, that “many were greatly injured by it.”50 But, he 
said, “none seemed to think the injury arose from the use of a bad thing, but 
from the abuse of a very good thing.”51 He shared the hope that there should be 
no more “drunkards” in society, suggesting that the way to achieve this 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 269. 
 44. For arguments on how this regulatory power was applied to suppress slaves, see Frederick 
Douglass, Address Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland, on Intemperance Viewed in Connection with 
Slavery (Feb. 18, 1846), in Yale Macmillan Ctr., Intemperance Viewed in Connection with Slavery, YALE 
U., https://glc.yale.edu/intemperance-viewed-connection-slavery [https://perma.cc/YB6C-MANY]. 
For arguments on how this regulatory power was applied to minority and immigrant communities 
generally, see Rathod, supra note 33, at 798–814. 
 45. See, e.g., Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 
32 (1877); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 133 (1873); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 
U.S. (5 How.) 504, 532–33 (1847). 
 46. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Abraham Lincoln, Temperance Address (Feb. 22, 1842), in Temperance Address, ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN ONLINE, http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/temperance.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/TGE4-MYZS]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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outcome is “entreaty and persuasion,” not “the thundering tones of anathema 
and denunciation.”52 
Notwithstanding Lincoln’s protestations, the temperance movement 
gained momentum, reaching a tipping point with Prohibition. As Justice 
Stevens wrote, “[T]he moral condemnation of the use of alcohol as a beverage 
represented . . . the views of a sufficiently large majority of the population to 
warrant the rare exercise of the power to amend the Constitution on two 
occasions.”53 First, the Eighteenth Amendment, ratified in 1919, prohibited 
the “manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors.”54 Prohibition 
failed due to states ceding enforcement of the amendment to federal 
authorities, the inability of federal authorities to effectuate meaningful 
enforcement, and the sense that the amendment itself lacked legitimacy.55 
Second, the Twenty-First Amendment, ratified in 1933, repealed the federal 
prohibition against transacting alcohol in commerce and yet also left open the 
opportunity for the states to enact their own prohibitions.56 
America’s historical experience with narcotics—opioids derived naturally 
or synthetically from poppy plants—is complicated as well. Narcotics were 
used for medical and other legitimate purposes. In 1804, after Aaron Burr shot 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, doctors gave Hamilton an opium-based 
tincture to alleviate his pain. 57  In 1810, Friedrich Sertürner discovered 
morphine, a substance ten times more powerful than opium that Sertürner 
acknowledged had addictive qualities. 58  During the Civil War, however, 
doctors gave ailing soldiers morphine as a painkiller and sedative, ignoring 
Sertürner’s warnings and erroneously believing that addiction could be 
avoided if the morphine was injected using hypodermic needles.59 A hundred 
thousand veterans of the war developed dependence on drugs or alcohol, 
which was referred to as “army disease” or “soldier’s disease.”60 In 1874, a 
chemist researching nonaddictive alternatives to morphine discovered 
heroin. 61  Twice as powerful as morphine, heroin’s medical benefits (for 
example, to suppress a cough, treat a cold, or act as a sedative) were promoted 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 494–95 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
 55. See Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative 
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2006). 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1; see also Br. for Illinois, et al. at 5, Tenn. Wine & Spirits 
Retailers Ass’n v. Blair, 139 S. Ct. 783 (2018) (No. 18-96), 2018 WL 6168781, at *5 (describing the 
two primary regulatory models followed by states in the aftermath of Prohibition). 
 57. MACY, supra note 4, at 21. 
 58. Id. at 21–22. 
 59. Id. at 22. 
 60. Id.; Charles G. Hoff, Jr., Drug Abuse, 51 MIL. L. REV. 147, 162 (1971). 
 61. MACY, supra note 4, at 23. 
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and its addictive potential was downplayed.62 By 1914, consistent with the 
temperance movement’s crackdown on alcohol, heroin and other narcotics 
were prohibited.63 Social judgments accompanied the legislative responses, 
with individuals addicted to drugs branded as “junkies” or worse.64 
Following the end of Prohibition, however, alcohol and drugs proceeded 
along different legal tracks. The consumption of alcohol itself has been largely 
untouched, with the main exception being the requirement that anyone 
purchasing or consuming alcohol be of a minimum age.65 That aside, the 
regulation of alcohol has focused primarily on ancillary or secondary issues, 
such as driving while under the influence of alcohol or being disorderly in 
public while intoxicated. By contrast, while some drugs, such as LSD, 
continued to be permitted for a brief period due to supposed medical or 
psychiatric benefits, the consumption of narcotics in any amount became 
strictly prohibited.66 Such prohibitions began in earnest with the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act of 1932 67  and were heightened with the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970,68 which remains in effect today and reflects the 
negative social perceptions and stringent regulatory treatment of drugs in the 
modern era. The Controlled Substances Act categorizes substances by tiers, 
according to their effects upon the person and their potential for abuse.69 
Rising concerns about drug use and associated violence in the 1980s 
contributed to the current, “tough” model of criminal justice. Following the 
tragic death of budding basketball star Len Bias from acute cocaine 
intoxication and the resulting national public outcry,70 Congress rushed to 
enact the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 71  This statute set forth severe 
mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses and established the infamous 
one-hundred-to-one ratio of the quantity needed to trigger mandatory 
 
 62. Id. at 23–24. 
 63. Id. at 25. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1987) (upholding Congress’ use of the 
Spending Clause to incentivize states to bring their minimum drinking ages up to twenty-one). 
 66. See Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (affirming the authority of a state to 
“exercise . . . its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous 
and habit-forming drugs”). 
 67. UNIF. NARCOTIC DRUG ACT, § 2, 9B U.L.A. 423 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE L. 1932). 
 68. See generally Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–971) (creating five drug schedules and implementing the National Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, among other actions). 
 69. See 21 U.S.C. § 812. 
 70. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Evolving Role of the United States Sentencing Commission, 33 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 3, 4–5 (2020). 
 71. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3,207 (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 841) (strengthening federal efforts at “eradicating” illicit drug sales and use).  
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minimums for “crack” and “powder” cocaine,72 respectively, a ratio that has 
since been reduced to eighteen-to-one through the Fair Sentencing Act.73 
Today, the significant social costs and public health consequences of 
alcohol and drugs are well documented.74 The retributive impulses of the 
1980s have tempered somewhat. A rehabilitative approach to low-level, 
nonviolent drug and alcohol offenses, typified by drug courts and similar 
treatment-centric programs, has emerged as an effective, evidence-based 
alternative to incarceration. 75  Moreover, there is an understanding that 
incarceration as a response to drug-related offenses carries significant, 
generational costs of its own. As Judge Amal Thapar has observed, “Kids who 
lost their parents to drugs . . . will now lose them again to jail. With broken 
homes and terrible role models, they, too, are likely to turn to drugs.”76 While 
marijuana continues to be listed as a prohibited substance under federal law, a 
growing number of states have permitted the medical use of marijuana or 
decriminalized the recreational possession and use of marijuana,77 signaling 
shifting social attitudes towards—and commensurate legal treatment of—at 
least this drug and perhaps drugs more generally. 
B. The Disease Model 
At the time of Prohibition, the medical community was split as to 
whether alcohol was a medical or moral issue.78 Today, consistent with Rush’s 
writings, addiction is largely understood to be a disease.79 
Alcohol and drugs impact the brain in three primary ways. First, they 
“over-activate” the pleasure center or reward circuit of the brain, known as the 
 
 72. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (setting the mandatory minimum for powder cocaine 
at 500 grams), with id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (setting the mandatory minimum for crack cocaine at 5 
grams). 
 73. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2,373 (2010) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(B)(ii)–(iii)). 
 74. See generally Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166–72 (2016) (explaining the 
history of alcohol laws and accidents in the United States to contextualize the three alcohol-related 
accidents before the Court). 
 75. See infra notes 353–58 and accompanying text. 
 76. Amul Thapar, The Prescription Drug Epidemic: A Federal Judge’s Perspective, PARTNERSHIP 
TO END ADDICTION (May 2011), https://drugfree.org/learn/drug-and-alcohol-news/the-prescription 
-drug-epidemic-a-federal-judges-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/KSK2-6LAD]. 
 77. See Natalie Fertig & Mona Zhang, 1 in 3 Americans Now Lives in a State Where Recreational 
Marijuana Is Legal, POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/04/1-in-3-
americans-lives-where-recreational-marijuana-legal-434004 [https://perma.cc/WRT3-NVDP]. 
 78. Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 794 n.51 (2004) 
(“[I]n a 1918 survey of health officials, 425 reported that physicians viewed addiction as a disease, 
while 542 stated that addiction was instead viewed as a vice.”). 
 79. See Nora D. Volkow, George F. Koob & A. Thomas McLellan, Neurobiologic Advances from 
the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363, 363 (2016) (“[N]euroscience 
continues to support the brain disease model of addiction.”). 
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basal ganglia. 80  Accordingly, an individual who drinks or uses may feel 
enhanced euphoria in response to ingesting alcohol or drugs.81 Despite the 
euphoria or “buzz” generated by alcohol, it is “classified . . . as a depressant 
because it later causes sedation and drowsiness.” 82  If heavily consumed, 
“alcohol can induce unconsciousness, coma, and even death.” 83  Opiate 
consumption produces a “surge of dopamine,” akin to “a tidal wave in the 
reward circuits of the brain.”84 A person on heroin recounts “feel[ing] like a 
master of the universe, like you’re being ‘hugged by Jesus,’” as if “there’s peace 
in your skin and not a single feeling of pain.” 85  Cocaine and 
methamphetamine are examples of stimulants, though they differ in how they 
produce stimulating effects: cocaine blocks dopamine from reabsorption, 
keeping it in circulation, whereas methamphetamine increases dopamine 
output.86 A person who drinks or uses drugs may increasingly crave and desire 
the substance due to these seemingly positive effects of the substance.87 With 
repeated use of the intoxicating substance, the individual develops a tolerance: 
the brain becomes accustomed to the alcohol or drug, and thus the person 
must introduce more of the alcohol or drug into their system to trigger the 
desired pleasurable response.88 
Second, once the body processes the alcohol or drugs and pleasurable 
feelings correspondingly fade, the extended amygdala—or stress-center of the 
brain—becomes particularly sensitive and the individual experiences 
symptoms associated with withdrawal, such as irritability and anxiety.89 Thus, 
an individual may seek out and ingest additional alcohol or drugs to reduce 
these symptoms, as opposed to the original objective of consumption—namely 
achieving or enhancing pleasure.90 Ceasing use following prolonged periods of 
use can generate acute symptoms of withdrawal. When an individual 
“detoxes,” or stops using in order to detoxify and rid the body of the alcohol 
 
 80. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/drugs-brain [https: 
//perma.cc/FZ2D-7LU5] (last updated July 2018) [hereinafter Drugs, Brains, and Behavior]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Information About Alcohol, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. 
(2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20360/ [https://perma.cc/SNW9-ZQ6P]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Shreeya Sinha, Heroin Addiction Explained: How Opioids Hijack the Brain, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/us/addiction-heroin-opioids.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B39P-A4L2 (dark archive)]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Methamphetamine Research Report, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/methamphetamine/how-methamphetamine 
-different-other-stimulants-such-cocaine [https://perma.cc/3BKF-59G5].  
 87. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 8080. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.80 
 90. Id. 
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or drugs and their lingering physical effects, the individual’s bodily response 
can be severe, including hallucinations, vomiting, and incontinence.91 Third, 
alcohol and drugs impact the prefrontal cortex, the decision-making center of 
the brain.92 A person’s judgment may be impaired, and inhibitions may be 
lowered, while alcohol or drugs are in their system.93 
Alcohol and drugs affect other parts of the body, too. The specific 
physical and psychological effects of intoxicating substances are not the same 
for all such substances but depend on various factors, including interactions 
with other drugs or medication, the amount of use, and the type of 
substance.94 Heroin, for example, attaches to the central nervous system and 
leads to respiratory depression.95 When an individual overdoses on heroin, 
respiration slows and can fail altogether. 96  To combat the decrease in 
respiration during an overdose, Naloxone can be administered (generally as a 
nasal form called Narcan). 97 Naloxone can save the life of an individual 
experiencing heroin overdose by blocking heroin’s receptors, thus diminishing 
respiratory depression and restoring normal, automated breathing functions.98 
C. Medical and Therapeutic Treatment 
The disease model of addiction informs the prevailing view that 
addiction itself is the product of multiple factors and can be treated. Heart 
 
 91. Id.; see also Julia O’Malley, Hooked, Part 3: Cravings Come at Night Taunting Her, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.adn.com/features/article/heroin-promises-
relief-daily-struggle/2010/06/22/ [https://perma.cc/HL4A-FWBY] (“It feels like the worst flu you’ve 
ever had. Your body aches. Your skin hurts. You sweat. You puke. You can’t control your bowels. 
Dread consumes you.”); Sinha, supra note 84 (“[Withdrawal] might [include] crippling pain, 
vomiting, insomnia, spasms, hot and cold flashes, goosebumps, congestion and tears. All this on top 
of debilitating anxiety and depression.”). In addition to immediate withdrawal, an individual who 
ceases to use drugs or alcohol may experience prolonged withdrawal symptoms lasting up to two 
years, referred to as Post-Acute Withdrawal Symptoms or PAWS. See Steven M. Melemis, Relapse 
Prevention and the Five Rules of Recovery, 88 YALE J. BIO. MED. 325, 328 (2015) (describing the 
symptoms of such post-acute withdrawal).  
 92. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80. 
 93. Id. 
 94. For a helpful chart on the precise effects that correspond with particular substances, see 
generally NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF 
SUBSTANCE USE (2004), https://ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/TrainingPackage/MOD2/Physicaland 
PsychEffectsSubstanceUse.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHZ2-KNT2]. 
 95. Caroline J. Jolley, James Bell, Gerrard F. Rafferty, John Moxham & John Strang, 
Understanding Heroin Overdose: A Study of the Acute Respiratory Depressant Effects of Injected 
Pharmaceutical Heroin, PLOS ONE, Oct. 23, 2015, at 10. 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. See Naloxone, SUBSTANCE ABUSE MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www. 
samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment/naloxone [https://perma.cc/PZ5U-OT6Y] (last 
updated Aug. 19, 2020). 
 98. Id. 
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disease, for example, has genetic, social, and other causes; 99 so too does 
addiction.100 Heart disease may be treated through medical and other means;101 
so too can addiction.102 
Addiction treatment responds to and is dependent upon the needs and 
circumstances of the individual.103 It may be helpful to consider treatment 
options along a continuum. On the acute end of the spectrum, a person who 
has used a substance in heavy amounts for an extended duration may need to 
detox, during which the effects of withdrawal from immediate cessation can be 
monitored in a hospital or inpatient setting, and/or managed through 
medication.104 Once the person is physically stable, they may be referred for 
inpatient or outpatient treatment.105 The former is more appropriate for an 
individual who does not have a stable living situation (such as someone who 
has been asked not to return to their house or who lives with others who 
actively drink or use) or who requires a high level of care (for example, 
 
 99. See Edward P. Havranek, Mahasin S. Mujahid, Donald A. Barr, Irene V. Blair, Meryl S. 
Cohen, Salvador Cruz-Flores, George Davey-Smith, Cheryl R. Dennison-Himmelfarb, Michael S. 
Lauer, Debra W. Lockwood, Milagros Rosal & Clyde W. Yancy, Social Determinants of Risks and 
Outcomes for Cardiovascular Disease: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association, 132 
CIRCULATION 873, 888 (2015) (“[A]lthough we have traditionally considered CVD the consequence 
of certain modifiable and nonmodifiable physiological, lifestyle, and genetic risk factors, we must now 
broaden the focus to incorporate a third arm of risk, the social determinants of health.”). 
 100. See Substance Abuse: Life Stages & Determinants, OFF. OF DISEASE PREVENTION & 
HEALTH PROMOTION, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/leading-health-indicators/2020-lhi-
topics/Substance-Abuse/determinants [https://perma.cc/L252-LEYM] (listing several determinants 
of substance abuse). 
 101. See NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., IN BRIEF: YOUR GUIDE TO LIVING WELL 
WITH HEART DISEASE 1 (2006), https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/sites/default/files/publications/06-
5716.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVN9-YWCD] (“Heart disease . . . can be treated in three ways: by 
making heart healthy changes in your daily habits, by taking medication, and in some cases, by having 
a medical procedure.”). 
 102. See What Is a Substance Abuse Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https:// 
www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/addiction/what-is-addiction [https://perma.cc/T7TT-MSQ4] 
(“Because [a Substance Abuse Disorder] affects many aspects of a person’s life, multiple types of 
treatment are often required. . . . Medications are used to control drug cravings, relieve severe 
symptoms of withdrawal, and prevent relapses. . . . Many people find mutual-aid groups helpful 
(Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, SMART Recover) [as well as s]elf-help groups that 
include family members (Al-Anon or Nar-Anon Family Groups).”).  
 103. See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TREATMENT APPROACHES FOR DRUG ADDICTION, 2 
(2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/drugfacts-treatmentapproaches.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9296-BSZA] (“No single treatment is right for everyone. . . . Effective treatment addresses 
all of the patient’s needs, not just his or her drug use. . . . Treatment plans must be reviewed often 
and modified to fit the patient’s changing needs.”). 
 104. Id. (“Medications help suppress withdrawal symptoms during detoxification.”); see also Drug 
and Alcohol Detox, ADDICTION CTR., https://www.addictioncenter.com/treatment/drug-and-alcohol-
detox/ [https://perma.cc/D69M-PR59] (“Detoxification, or detox, is the process of letting the body 
remove the drugs in it. The purpose of detox is to safely manage withdrawal symptoms when 
someone stops taking drugs or alcohol.”). 
 105. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80103. 
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someone who has been unable to improve in an outpatient environment).106 
Typically, both inpatient and outpatient treatment involve a combination of 
individual therapy, group therapy, and medically assisted treatment 
(“MAT”).107 Individual therapy generally consists of the patient meeting with 
a licensed counselor or therapist to discuss the reasons for use, triggers, and 
other circumstances impacting the person’s inability to achieve and maintain 
sobriety, and any related or co-occurring mental health issues, such as anxiety, 
trauma, or depression, that may impact the person’s drinking or use.108 Group 
therapy generally consists of peer-based support facilitated or supervised by a 
licensed counselor or therapist.109 A group therapy session generally includes 
three components: an initial check-in part in which participants share how 
they are feeling or doing that day or since they were last in group; a part in 
which participants further discuss issues raised by other participants, using “I” 
statements as opposed to giving advice through “you” statements; and an 
educational part in which participants learn about coping mechanisms (for 
example, art therapy and meditation), forms of self-care, how the brain is 
impacted by addiction, and so on.110 
MAT consists of the administration of appropriate medication for 
addiction and any co-occurring mental health disorders.111 An individual with 
an addiction to alcohol, for example, may be given Antabuse (which can make 
the individual physically ill if they ingest alcohol while on this medication and 
 
 106. See id. 103(“Impatient or residential treatment can also be very effective, especially for those 
with more severe problems (including co-occurring disorders).”). 
 107. See Medications, Counseling, and Related Conditions, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment [https:// 
perma.cc/DS6W-85CZ] [hereinafter MAT Medications] (defining MAT as “the use of medications, in 
combination with counseling and behavioral therapies, to provide a ‘whole-patient’ approach to the 
treatment of substance use disorders”). 
 108. See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION 
TREATMENT: A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 28 (3rd ed. 2018) [hereinafter Principles of Drug 
Addiction],  https://www.drugabuse.gov/download/675/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-
based-guide-third-edition.pdf?v=74dad603627bab89b93193918330c223 [https://perma.cc/2ZHN-
8T7S] (“Individualized drug counseling not only focuses on reducing or stopping illicit drug or 
alcohol use; it also addresses related areas of impaired functioning . . . as well as the content and the 
structure of the patient’s recovery program. Through its emphasis on short-term behavioral goals, 
individualized counseling helps the patient develop coping strategies and tools to abstain from drug 
use and maintain abstinence.”). 
 109. Id. (detailing how group therapy may “capitalize on the social reinforcement offered by peer 
discussion and to help promote drug-free lifestyles”); see also CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT: GROUP THERAPY xv (2005) (discussing how “[i]n 
the hands of a skilled, well-trained group leader, the potential healing powers inherent in a group can 
be harnessed and directed to foster” positive outcomes). 
 110. See CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, supra note 109109109, at xvi–xvii 
(describing the advantages of group therapy as including “positive peer support; a reduction in 
clients’ sense of isolation; real-life examples of people in recovery; help from peers in coping with 
substance abuse and other life problems; [and] information and feedback from peers”). 
 111. See MAT Medications, supra note 107. 
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thus serves as a deterrent to drinking alcohol),112 or Vivitrol (which blocks the 
ability of the individual to experience euphoria from alcohol).113 Aside from 
the precise effect, the length of the effect also is an important distinction 
between the two medications. Antabuse lasts in the body for several days and 
Vivitrol for several weeks.114 MAT, during detox and the post-detox phase, 
also may include maintenance medications, such as suboxone, methadone, or 
buprenorphine, which are prescribed opiates designed to minimize physical 
dependence and the effects of acute withdrawal.115 
Inpatient and outpatient treatment typically lasts for one to two 
months.116 An overarching goal of such treatment is to put the individual in a 
position to develop their own support structure that they will then be able to 
rely upon when formal rehabilitation ends. 117 When an individual enters 
treatment, they may be encouraged or expected to attend ninety twelve-step 
meetings in ninety days (known as the “90 in 90”), based on the belief that it 
takes ninety days for the brain to learn and develop a new habit, to ensure that 
the individual develops their own independent support system.118 During a 
rehabilitation program, an individual also may be encouraged or expected to 
obtain a sponsor, who is typically someone with extended “clean time” who 
has completed or “worked” a twelve-step program and who can serve as a 
mentor, guide, and advisor during the recovery process. 119  Once a 
rehabilitation program is over, the participant may be encouraged to attend 
twelve-step meetings, be actively meeting with their sponsor, and serve the 
recovery community. 
 
 112. Using Disulfiram To Treat Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, AM. ADDICTION CTRS., https:// 
americanaddictioncenters.org/addiction-medications/disulfiram [https://perma.cc/4G9T-MZTA] 
(last updated June 19, 2019). 
 113. Overview of Vivitrol (Naltrexone), AM. ADDICTION CTRS., https://americanaddiction 
centers.org/addiction-medications/vivitrol [https://perma.cc/KLR4-5ENK] (last updated Feb. 4, 
2020). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See MAT Medications, supra note 107107; see also Sinha, supra note 84 (“[Buprenorphine, 
methadone, and naltrexone] soften the cravings without causing euphoria.”). 
 116. See Matt Gonzales, How Long Does Rehab Take?, DRUGREHAB.COM, https://www. 
drugrehab.com/treatment/how-long-does-rehab-take/ [https://perma.cc/DB5A-N9VS] (last updated 
Feb. 26, 2020). 
 117. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 9 (“In addition to stopping drug abuse, the 
goal of treatment is to return people to productive functioning in the family, workplace, and 
community.”). 
 118. See 90 Meetings in 90 Days, LION ROCK RECOVERY, https://www.lionrockrecovery 
.com/drug-and-alcohol-addiction-resources/advice/90-meetings-in-90-days [https://perma.cc/XJR4-
ZDA5]. 
 119. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 28 (“Self-help groups can complement and 
extend the effects of professional treatment.”); see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS ON SPONSORSHIP 13 (2019) (describing the vital role of a sponsor as doing 
“everything possible . . . to help the newcomer get sober and stay sober through the A.A. program”). 
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Twelve-step meetings, such as Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) and 
Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”), offer the individual a practical blueprint for 
recovery, beginning with a desire to be sober and an acknowledgment that the 
individual is incapable of achieving and maintaining sobriety on their own.120 
Both AA and NA tout recovery through fellowship, and the organization and 
meetings themselves espouse equality and volunteerism and lack any rigid 
hierarchy.121 Twelve-step meetings are not monolithic: some involve a single 
person providing opening comments (a “lead”) that may contain a theme or 
question that other individuals can, but need not, address during their 
comments (or “share”); some involve speakers, much like a lecture about one’s 
journey from active addiction to recovery; and still others may involve reading 
from and commenting on AA or NA literature.122 In addition to AA or NA, 
there are other fellowship meetings, such as SMART Recovery (which may be 
distinguished from AA and NA in that these meetings do not include any 
element of a higher power and also permit cross-talk),123 Celebrate Recovery 
(which bills itself as a “Christ-centered 12-step program”), 124 and Refuge 
Recovery (a spiritual or mindfulness-based approach based principally on a 
book by Noah Levine).125 
Benjamin Rush, who helped pioneer the disease model of addiction, 
suggested that an individual with drug or alcohol disease abstain completely 
from these substances.126 Abstinence remains, for some, a core component of 
 
 120. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, THE TWELVE STEPS AND THE TWELVE TRADITIONS 21 
(77th ed. 2012) (“We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become 
unmanageable.”); NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, INSTITUTIONAL GROUP GUIDE, TWELVE STEPS OF 
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 2 (1998) (“We admitted that we were powerless over our addiction, that 
our lives had become unmanageable.”). 
 121. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, DAILY REFLECTIONS, at Feb. 8 (1990) [hereinafter 
DAILY REFLECTIONS] (“Regular attendance at meetings, serving and helping others is the 
recipe that many have tried and found to be successful.”); ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, A.A. FACT 
FILE 4 (2018) [hereinafter A.A. FACT FILE], https://www.aa.org/assets/en_US/m-24_aafactfile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BR6A-Y839] (“Alcoholics Anonymous is not organized in the formal or political 
sense. There are no governing officers, no rules or regulations, no fees or dues.”). 
 122. See Buddy T, Going to Your First 12-Step Meeting, VERYWELL MIND, https://www. 
verywellmind.com/what-can-i-expect-at-a-12-step-meeting-63409 [https://perma.cc/Y8WD-NBGC] 
(last updated May 22, 2020) (“Different meetings have different ways of doing things . . . . In some 
meetings, people are randomly called on . . . . In other meetings, at the end of the prayer, everyone 
may say a popular AA slogan . . . .”). 
 123. See SMART Recovery Meetings Cross 2,000 Mark, Including 1,000 in U.S., SMART 
RECOVERY (Mar. 28, 2016), https://smartrecovery.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2000thMeeting 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9ET-N7XM]. 
 124. See CELEBRATE RECOVERY, https://www.celebraterecovery.com [https://perma.cc/ZAG8-
NXW3]. 
 125. NOAH LEVINE, REFUGE RECOVERY: A BUDDHIST PATH TO RECOVERING FROM 
ADDICTION (2014). 
 126. BENJAMIN RUSH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF ARDENT SPIRITS UPON THE 
HUMAN BODY AND MIND 36 (8th ed. 1823) (“[M]y observations authorize me to say; that persons 
who have been addicted to them, should abstain from them suddenly and entirely. ‘Taste not, handle 
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addiction treatment and recovery.127 Twelve-step programs also subscribe to 
the proposition that an individual who seeks to address addiction must abstain 
from not only the drug of choice but from all other drugs as well.128 A person 
with an addiction to alcohol, therefore, would not be permitted to ingest 
marijuana or another drug. The use of medications that may be habit-forming 
also would be counseled against under an abstinence model. 
A growing alternative to the abstinence model is the harm-reduction 
model, typified by safe injection sites in which an individual with substance 
use disorder is offered “medically supervised consumption and observation 
rooms” and is encouraged to enter treatment.129 The federal government has 
argued, and the Third Circuit recently agreed, that these safe consumption 
sites are inconsistent with federal law.130 Nonetheless, these sites do have the 
support of some members of the medical community, including the American 
Medical Association.131 
The threshold consideration of whether an individual has an addiction to 
alcohol or drugs takes the form of an intake assessment conducted by a 
licensed counselor or therapist. 132 The leading reference guide for clinical 
addiction professionals is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM-V”), published by the American Psychiatric Association.133 
The DSM-V categorizes substance abuse and alcohol abuse as “disorders.”134 
The DSM-V suggests a holistic assessment of whether an individual possesses 
either disorder, listing eleven factors (for example, “unsuccessful efforts” to 
 
not, touch not,’ should be inscribed upon every vessel that contains spirits in the house of a man, who 
wishes to be cured of habits of intemperance.”). 
 127. See A.A. FACT FILE, supra note 121, at 9120; NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 120. 
 128. See A.A. FACT FILE, supra note 121, at 9; NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 120. 
 129. United States v. Safehouse, 408 F. Supp. 3d 583, 586 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
 130. See Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, United States v. Safehouse, 2020 WL 906997 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-0519), 2020 WL 562321, at *2 (calling the “‘safe’ injection site” a 
“radical public health experiment” that “violates the plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2), which 
makes it a crime to manage or control any place and ‘knowingly and intentionally’ make the place 
available for unlawfully using a controlled substance”); United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 243 
(3d Cir. 2021) (holding that the consumption rooms were unlawful).  
 131. See Press Release, AMA Wants New Approaches To Combat Synthetic and Injectable Drugs, AM. 
MED. ASS’N (June 12, 2017), http://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-wants-new-
approaches-combat-synthetic-and-injectable-drugs [https://perma.cc/FTY8-58QQ] (“[T]he AMA 
today voted to support the development of pilot facilities where people who use intravenous drugs 
can inject self-provided drugs under medical supervision.”). 
 132. For a list of validated assessments, see Screening and Assessment Tools Chart, NAT’L INST. ON 
DRUG ABUSE (June 22, 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/nidamed-medical-health-professionals/ 
screening-tools-resources/chart-screening-tools [https://perma.cc/XY9Z-YRYP]. 
 133. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
 134. Id. at xlii (“The categories of substance abuse and substance dependence have been 
eliminated and replaced with an overarching new category of substance use disorders—with the 
specific substance used defining the specific disorders.”). 
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curb consumption and “tolerance”) to guide that assessment.135 An individual 
must manifest at least two factors in a twelve-month period to qualify for 
substance use disorder. 136 An individual with a mild presentation of the 
disorder will possess two or three factors in that span, moderate four to five, 
and severe at least six.137 Individuals with an addiction may not all drink or 
use in the same way: one need not drink or use daily or alone to qualify. One 
who goes on periodic binges in public, for example, can be an individual with 
an alcohol or substance use disorder, as may someone who drinks or uses every 
day.138 
Despite the increased sense that addiction is a disease and not a moral 
failing, the social stigma associated with addiction persists. 139 This social 
 
 135. The eleven diagnostic criteria for alcohol use disorder are: 
1.  Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended. 
2.  There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol use. 
3.  A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain alcohol, use alcohol, or 
recover from its effects. 
4.  Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol. 
5.  Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, 
school, or home. 
6.  Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal 
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol. 
7.  Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because 
of alcohol use. 
8.  Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically hazardous. 
9.  Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical 
or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol. 
10. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: a. A need for markedly increased 
amounts of alcohol to achieve intoxication or desired effect. b. A markedly diminished effect 
with continued use of the same amount of alcohol. 
11.  Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following: a. The characteristic withdrawal 
syndrome or alcohol . . . . b. Alcohol (or a closely related substance, such as a 
benzodiazepine) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms. 
Id. at 490–91. The diagnostic criteria for other substances are generally the same diagnostic criteria 
used for alcohol use disorder with only small variations. See id. at 509–10 (cannabis use disorder); id. 
at 520 (phencyclidine use disorder); id. at 533–34 (inhalant use disorder); id. at 541 (opioid use 
disorder); id. at 550–51 (sedative, hypnotic, or anxiolytic use disorder); id. at 561 (stimulant use 
disorder—including cocaine). 
 136. Id. at 490. 
 137. Id. at 484. AA and NA similarly pose a series of questions to help the individual determine 
whether they may have a problem. 
 138. See Researchers Identify Alcoholism Subtypes, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & 
ALCOHOLISM (June 28, 2007), https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/researchers-
identify-alcoholism-subtypes [https://perma.cc/R85T-CTQL]; Bankole A. Johnson, Medication 
Treatment of Different Types of Alcoholism, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 630, 630 (2010). 
 139. See, e.g., Stephanie Desmon & Susan Morrow, Drug Addiction Viewed More Negatively Than 
Mental Illness, Johns Hopkins Study Shows, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://hub.jhu.edu/ 
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stigma has existed from the founding of our nation. Those who sought to boot 
a federal judge from office charged as a reason for impeachment that he had 
“bad moral character due to drunkenness.”140 (Today, a federal judge whose 
drinking is a concern would be referred to a committee within Article III 
governing judicial disability).141 In the twentieth century, members of the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the “harsh moral attitude which our society has 
traditionally taken toward intoxication and the shame which we have 
associated with alcoholism,” further observing that “Anglo-American society 
has long condemned [alcoholism] as a moral defect” and “cultural taboo.”142 
Unfavorable public perceptions of individuals with drug or alcohol diseases are 
easy to find among the public, 143 in popular culture, 144 and even among 
physicians.145 Stigma contributes to individuals with drug or alcohol diseases 
 
2014/10/01/drug-addiction-stigma/ [https://perma.cc/KHT8-BSQ2] (summarizing a study in which 
respondents reported disinterest in working with a person with an addiction and noting that 
respondents continue to believe that addiction is a moral failing). 
 140. MAVEETY, supra note 26, at 12. 
 141. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364. 
 142. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968). 
 143. See, e.g., K.M. Keyes, M.L. Hatzenbuehler, K.A. McLaughlin, B. Link, M. Offoson, B.F. 
Grant & D. Hasin, Stigma and Treatment for Alcohol Disorders in the United States, 172 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1364, 1365 (2010) (“Alcohol disorders are among the most highly stigmatized of the 
psychiatric disorders. For example, public perceptions of individuals with alcohol disorders include 
negative labels, such as dangerous, immoral, and blameworthy.”); Georg Schomerus, Michael Lucht, 
Anita Holzinger, Herbert Matschinger, Mauro G. Carta & Matthias C. Angermeyer, The Stigma of 
Alcohol Dependence Compared with Other Mental Disorders: A Review of Population Studies, 46 ALCOHOL 
& ALCOHOLISM 105, 105 (2011) (describing the negative consequences of alcohol dependence and 
noting that “[t]he stigma of alcoholism is likely to aggravate these effects; it may hinder the seeking 
of professional and lay help, because people fear being labelled alcoholics and subsequently 
experiencing loss of status and discrimination”); Georg Schomerus, The Stigma of Alcohol and Other 
Substance Abuse, in THE STIGMA OF DISEASE AND DISABILITY: UNDERSTANDING CAUSES AND 
OVERCOMING INJUSTICES 57, 57–58 (Patrick W. Corrigan ed., 2014).  
 144. In Breaking Bad, for example, Walter White calls his former student Jesse Pinkman a 
“pathetic junkie,” adding, “You are just a drug addict.” Breaking Bad: Down (AMC television 
broadcast Mar. 29, 2009). Likewise, in The Wire, D’Angelo Barksdale, a mid-level player in a drug 
distribution ring, calls out his subordinates for their dismissive attitude towards a customer who is 
looking for heroin. Barksdale protests their treating “him like a dog,” arguing, “You ain’t gotta punk 
em like that.” The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002). The street-level dealers 
justify their attitude by suggesting the individual with drug or alcohol disease deserves or invites such 
treatment: “He punked hisself. [sic] He a goddamn addict,” emphasizing again, “they [just] dope 
fiends.” Id. 
 145. See Schomerus et al., supra note 143, at 59; Leonieke C. van Boekel, Evelien P.M. Brouwers, 
Jaap van Weeghel & Henk F.L. Garretsen, Stigma Among Health Professionals Towards Patients with 
Substance Use Disorders and Its Consequences for Healthcare Delivery: Systemic Review, 131 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 23, 24 (2013); Cecelia Kathleen Mendiola, Giorgio Galetto & Michael 
Fingerhood, An Exploration of Emergency Physicians’ Attitudes Towards Patients with Substance Use 
Disorder, 12 J. ADDICTION MED. 132, 132 (2018).  
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internalizing these negative attitudes and experiencing shame, embarrassment, 
and similar feelings, and in turn not coming forward to seek help.146 
While the disease model is prevalent, it is not without criticism. A 
leading objection to the disease model points to research indicating that some 
individuals who seemed at one time to be addicted to alcohol or drugs are 
able, without treatment, to resume consumption of their drug of choice 
without exhibiting the adverse consequences suggesting an addiction.147 In an 
oft-quoted study, approximately fifteen to twenty percent of American 
soldiers who served in the Vietnam War were addicted to heroin, but of those 
who returned home, only five percent exhibited an addiction within the 
following year and only twelve percent relapsed within three years.148 This 
transformation apparently occurred “overnight” and “spontaneously,” without 
the aid of formal rehabilitation.149 
Another major criticism of the disease model derives from its insistence 
that the individual with drug or alcohol disease abstain from alcohol or drugs. 
This insistence is predicated on the proposition that an individual with drug 
or alcohol disease cannot ingest any healthy amount of alcohol or drugs. 
Studies on controlled drinking suggest, however, that certain individuals with 
addiction may be able to ingest alcohol without giving rise to the negative 
factors that indicate an addiction to alcohol.150 To be fair, according to this 
research, only some are able to return to drinking that is not problematic; the 
more one is dependent on alcohol, the less likely that such a return is 
possible.151 The ability of some to safely return to alcohol cuts against, for 
critics, the disease model’s categorical insistence on abstinence. 
*    *    * 
This part explained the historical, physiological, and corrective 
components of addiction. This descriptive overview established a factual 
foundation for the next part on how the law has addressed addiction. 
 
 146. See Gail D’Onfrio, Fight the Opioid Epidemic with Stigma-Free Treatment, CATO UNBOUND 
(Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2019/08/21/gail-donofrio/fight-opioid-epidemic-
stigma-free-treatment [https://perma.cc/E2WP-U4P9]. 
 147. See Nick Heather, Is the Concept of Compulsion Useful in the Explanation or Description of 
Addictive Behavior and Experience?, 6 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. REPS. 15, 27–28 (2017); Lee N. Robins, 
Vietnam Veterans’ Rapid Recovery from Heroin Addiction: A Fluke or Normal Expectation?, 88 
ADDICTION 1041, 1053 (1993). 
 148. JAMES CLEAR, ATOMIC HABITS: AN EASY & PROVEN WAY TO BUILD GOOD HABITS & 
BREAK BAD ONES 91 (2018).  
 149. Id. at 92.  
 150. See William R. Miller, Controlled Drinking: A History and a Critical Review, 44 J. STUD. ON 
ALCOHOL 68, 78–79 (1983). 
 151. See Alcohol Abstinence vs. Moderation, HARV. MED. SCH. (Jan. 2009), http://www.health 
.harvard.edu/mind-and-mood/alcohol-abstinence-vs-moderation [https://perma.cc/YG48-JH6G]. 
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II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADDICTION 
This part describes how the courts have translated matters of addiction 
into legal concepts and rules. It first briefly sketches the relationship of 
addiction with four common criminal law concepts: voluntary intoxication, 
involuntary intoxication, temporary insanity, and fixed insanity. It then 
provides a detailed summary of the two Supreme Court cases—Robinson and 
Powell—on the criminal responsibility of individuals with an addiction to 
drugs or alcohol. Lastly, it summarizes the two legal models that have 
emerged from these two seminal cases. 
A. Intoxication and Insanity 
This section summarizes the primary and varied methods by which issues 
related to addiction have been introduced in criminal theory and litigation. A 
manifestation of addiction is intoxication, or heavy consumption that leads to 
impaired judgment, impaired motor functioning, and loss of inhibitions.152 
Circumstances in which intoxication and criminal law may intersect are easy 
to conceptualize. A criminal defendant may claim, for example, that criminal 
liability is not appropriate because they were intoxicated and the incident was 
completely out of character. 
Voluntary Intoxication. In considering this line of argument, courts will 
probe whether the ingestion of the alcohol or drug producing the alleged state 
of intoxication was voluntary or involuntary. “Voluntary intoxication” occurs 
when an individual ingests a substance known by the individual to possess 
intoxicating properties.153 The individual need not know the precise type or 
brand of substance for the ingestion to be voluntary; all that is required, other 
than the act of knowing ingestion, is knowledge that what the individual is 
putting into their system is of an intoxicating quality.154 A person who goes to 
a party, drinks what they know to be alcohol, and becomes intoxicated from 
 
 152. The medical basis for these effects is discussed supra in Section I.B. 
 153. State v. Champagne, 447 P.3d 297, 317 (Ariz. 2019) (citing State v. Payne, 314 P.3d 1239, 
1272–73 (Ariz. 2013)). 
 154. See Cribb v. State, 45 S.E. 396, 397 (Ga. 1903) (“There was no evidence on which to charge 
as to the effect of drugging the ale alleged to have been used by the defendant, nor can the courts 
establish a precedent which would authorize a chemical investigation as to whether the liquor was 
good or bad, pure or impure, drugged, or containing only malt, spirituous, or vinous qualities. 
Drunkenness voluntarily produced by one sort of liquor is no more an excuse for crime than that 
caused by any other kind of intoxicating drink.”); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 457, 196 S.E.2d 777, 
786 (1973) (“‘[I]nvoluntary intoxication is a very rare thing, and can never exist when the person 
intoxicated knows what he is drinking, and drinks the intoxicant voluntarily, and without being made 
to do so by force or coercion.’ . . . Thus it is only when alcohol has been induced into a person’s 
system without his knowledge or by force majeure that his intoxication will be regarded as 
involuntary.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Perryman v. State, 159 P. 937–38 
(Okla. 1916)). 
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having several such drinks has become voluntarily intoxicated, despite the fact 
that they intended to drink without reaching a state of intoxication. 
At common law, voluntary intoxication, where the ingestion was 
attributed to the free will of the defendant, did not excuse or otherwise 
diminish an individual’s exposure to criminal liability. 155  Lord Hale, for 
example, wrote that he who became voluntarily intoxicated “shall have no 
privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same 
judgment as if he were in his right senses.”156 If anything, at common law, 
voluntary intoxication was deemed to be an aggravating factor in liability 
assessments. For example, Sir William Blackstone described voluntary 
intoxication “as an aggravation of the offence, rather than as an excuse for any 
criminal misbehaviour.”157 Early American jurisprudence is consistent with 
this strict common law approach to voluntary intoxication. Justice Story, 
reflecting both the common law tradition and the general social aversion to 
the intoxicated individual, asserted that “[d]runkenness is a gross vice, and in 
the contemplation of some of our laws is a crime; and I learned in my earlier 
studies, that so far from its being in law an excuse for murder, it is rather an 
aggravation of its malignity.”158 
In modern criminal cases, a prosecutor may rely on voluntary 
intoxication to help prove that the defendant had diminished inhibitions and 
thus was more capable of committing the act in question.159 The prosecution 
also may point to the relevant behavior of the defendant to demonstrate 
capability and intent (such as, retrieving a weapon from a vehicle, or taking 
aim and shooting the victim in the head), to blunt the relevance of the 
intoxicated state of the defendant.160 The defense generally will be unable to 
 
 155. See Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1944) 
(“The early common law apparently made no concession whatever because of intoxication . . . .”). 
 156. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 44 (1996) (quoting 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN *32–*33); accord Reniger v. Fogossa [1816] 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 31 (KB) (“[I]f a person that is 
drunk kills another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it, and yet he did it through 
ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no understanding nor memory; but inasmuch as that 
ignorance was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be 
privileged thereby.”). 
 157. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 44 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25–*26). 
 158. United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 657–58 (C.C. R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868). 
 159. See State v. Payette, 38 A.3d 1120, 1127 (R.I. 2012) (“A claim of diminished capacity will 
negate the specific intent charged only if the intoxication is found to be ‘of such a degree as to 
completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him the power to withstand evil 
impulses[,] and render his mind incapable of forming any sane design.’” (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added)). 
 160. See, e.g., Lewellyn v. State, 523 N.E.2d 768, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that 
voluntary intoxication did not render defendant incapable of forming necessary intent to commit 
crime, as evidenced by the fact that the “[defendant] threatened to shoot [the victim]. Then [the 
defendant] walked to a gun cabinet, removed a pump shotgun, pumped the gun, turned and shot [the 
victim] in the chest”). 
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use voluntary intoxication to negate criminal responsibility because of the 
principle that the intoxication can be traced to the individual’s free will. But 
the defense may challenge whether the defendant was capable of carrying out 
the crime due to an intoxicated state (for example, if the defendant was passed 
out)161 or whether the defendant possessed the mental state required under the 
statute (in other words, whether the defendant intended to commit the act).162 
Involuntary Intoxication. In contrast to voluntary intoxication, 
“involuntary intoxication” generally occurs when the ingestion of a substance 
with intoxicating properties, or that produces an unexpected intoxicating 
effect, is not the product of the individual’s free will.163 In general, involuntary 
intoxication occurs in one of two circumstances: First, when the 
involuntariness is attributable to a third party, such as a person who compels 
or tricks the individual into ingesting an intoxicant164 or a medical professional 
who prescribes a substance with an unforeseeable intoxicating effect. 165 
Second, when the involuntariness is attributable to the individual ingesting 
the intoxicant, such as an individual who accidentally ingests a substance with 
an unforeseeable intoxicating effect166 or an individual who knowingly ingests 
a substance that produces an abnormal or unexpected reaction of 
intoxication.167 At both common law and at present, involuntary intoxication 
negates criminal liability.168 
 
 161. See Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Prosecution of Chronic Alcoholic for Drunkenness Offenses, 40 
A.L.R.3d 321 (1971) (first citing Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); then citing Easter 
v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); then citing State v. Fearon, 166 N.W.2d 720 
(Minn. 1969); and then citing City of Seattle v. Hill, 435 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1967)). 
 162. See generally R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary 
Intoxication as Defense to Criminal Charge, 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966) (discussing cases where the 
defendant argued their alcoholism prevented the defendant from having the requisite intent to 
commit the crime). 
 163. See Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Involuntary intoxication 
results from fraud, trickery or duress of another, accident or mistake on defendant’s part, pathological 
condition, or ignorance as to the effect of prescribed medication.”). 
 164. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, When Intoxication Deemed Involuntary so as To Constitute 
a Defense to Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195 (1976) (first citing United States v. Jewett, 438 F.2d 
495 (8th Cir. 1971); then citing Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029 (Ariz. 1931); then citing People v. 
White, 264 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); and then citing People v. Scott, 194 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1983)). 
 165. See id. (first citing Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408 (4th Cir. 1915); then citing Johnson 
v. State, 24 So. 2d 228 (Ala. Ct. App. 1945); then citing Boswell v. State, 610 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1992); and then citing Saldiveri v. State, 143 A.2d 70 (Md. 1958)). 
 166. See id. (first citing State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1999); then citing People v. 
Penman, 110 N.E. 894 (Ill. 1915); and then citing Dubs v. State, 235 A.2d 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1967)). 
 167. See id. (first citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 129 A. 453 (Pa. 1925); then citing People v. 
Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987); then citing Hurley v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1970); 
and then citing Sluyter v. State, 941 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 168. See id. 
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While an individual who initially ingests a substance that produces 
unexpected or unanticipated adverse intoxicating effects may not be 
considered culpable, any continued use with knowledge of those adverse 
effects may not protect the individual from the ordinary operation or 
application of culpability principles.169 This rule is consistent with tort law. 
For example, a driver who suffers an unforeseeable medical incident and 
crashes into another may escape civil liability, but if the driver subsequently 
engages in the same behavior, they would have a more difficult time claiming 
a lack of knowledge, culpability, and responsibility.170 Consider the example of 
an individual who has had fainting spells and crashes a car while unconscious 
or asleep. The individual’s knowledge of the condition that produced the loss 
of consciousness “is enough to make him guilty of a crime.”171 
Insanity. Insanity is another vehicle by which intoxication and addiction 
are raised in the criminal context. In general, insanity concerns whether the 
individual can appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. 172 Temporary 
insanity speaks to a short-term inability, attributed to the ingestion of alcohol 
or drugs, to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions. 173  Whether 
temporary insanity may serve as a viable defense depends, as with voluntary 
and involuntary intoxication, on whether the temporary insanity was brought 
on by voluntary or involuntary conduct.174 
 
 169. See id. (first citing Montero v. State, 996 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); and then 
citing People v. Mahle, 78 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)). 
 170. See Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Liability for Automobile Accident Allegedly Caused by 
Driver’s Blackout, Sudden Unconsciousness, or the Like, 93 A.L.R.3d 326 (1979). But see Hassman, supra 
note 164 (explaining that an alcoholic drinking alcohol has been considered an involuntary act in a 
number of cases even if the defendant knowingly consumes the alcohol). 
 171. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1(c) (3d ed. 2018). 
 172. See United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In a case where the 
defendant asserts the affirmative defense of insanity, the ultimate issue is whether at the time of the 
crime the defendant ‘appreciated the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.’”); United 
States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The prosecution conceded Ewing suffered from 
paranoid schizophrenia but argued he was not legally insane because he was able to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his actions.”). 
 173. See Phillip E. Hassman, Effect of Voluntary Drug Intoxication upon Criminal Responsibility, 73 
A.L.R.3d 98 (1976) (describing that “[u]nderlying most attempts to gain recognition of voluntary 
drug intoxication as a defense to a criminal act is some form of an insanity defense; but it is a 
temporary insanity, a mental state that disappears when the effects of the drug wear off”). 
 174. See United States v. F.D.L., 836 F.2d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that, under an 
insanity defense, as with involuntary intoxication, “[t]he defendant is excused from criminality 
because intoxication affects the ability to distinguish between right and wrong”); id. at 1117 
(“Congress in recently revising the Insanity defense statute specifically rejected voluntary 
intoxication as a defense even if it renders the defendant unable to appreciate the nature and quality 
of his acts.”); see also Martin v. Scroggy, No. 86-6212, 1987 WL 38721, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1987) 
(rejecting defendant’s proposed temporary insanity defense resulting from an abnormal reaction to 
alcohol). 
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Fixed Insanity. A defendant may seek to avoid criminal liability by 
invoking the doctrine of fixed or settled insanity. Under this doctrine, 
continued intoxication has produced or contributed to a permanent inability of 
the individual to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. 175 Such a 
defense was recognized in early nineteenth-century English law, as reported 
by Lord Hale.176 The concept found its way into American judicial opinions 
shortly thereafter.177 As with insanity stemming from involuntary intoxication, 
settled insanity is a viable defense to criminal liability. Justice Story explains: 
“[I]nsanity, whose remote cause is habitual drunkenness, is, or is not, an 
excuse . . . for a [crime] committed by the party while so insane, but not at the 
time intoxicated, or under the influence of liquor. . . . [I]nsanity is an excuse 
for the commission of every crime.”178 That said, the settled insanity defense 
seems to be a narrow one, limited to those circumstances in which the 
individual is in a perpetual state of inability to appreciate or regulate his 
 
 175. See Greider v. Duckworth, 701 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983) (“While temporary mental 
incapacity induced by voluntary intoxication is generally not a defense, the law will not hold an 
accused responsible for his acts where the ingestion of intoxicants has been abused to the point that it 
has produced mental disease such that the accused is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”). 
 176. See Parker v. State, 254 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (“Hale, as the law does 
today, distinguished between temporary insanity caused by voluntary drunkenness and that caused by 
involuntary drunkenness and he recognized that permanent insanity, even though caused by 
voluntary drinking excused the commission of a crime. The rule of law with respect to responsibility 
for criminal conduct as affected by voluntary intoxication which has been consistently followed by 
the majority of courts in the United States is substantially that stated by Lord Hale.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Springer v. Collins, 586 F.2d 329, 333–34 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Parker, 254 A.2d 
at 388); Jones v. Stephens, 157 F. Supp. 3d 623, 661 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (citing Evers v. State, 20 
S.W. 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1892)); Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811, 815–16 (Colo. 1993). 
 178. United States v. Drew, 25 Fed. Cas. 913, 913 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 14,993). A 
California court offers this helpful language: 
If [individual reason] is perverted or destroyed by fixed disease, though brought on by his 
own vices, the law holds him not accountable, but if, by a voluntary act, he temporarily casts 
off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done him if he is considered 
answerable for any injury which, in that state, he may do to others or to society . . . It must 
be “settled insanity”, and not merely a temporary mental condition . . . which will relieve 
one of the responsibility of his criminal act. 
Bieber, 856 P.2d at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Lim Dum Dong, 78 P.2d 1026, 1028 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1938); see also Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 860, 872 (1871) (“If 
permanent insanity be produced by habitual drunkenness, then, like any other insanity, it excuses an 
act which would be otherwise criminal.”). 
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conduct.179 Possessing an addiction, by itself, will not suffice to demonstrate 
such insanity.180 
B. Supreme Court Guideposts 
The Supreme Court has handed down two cases—Robinson and Powell—
on criminal law and addiction. This section summarizes these two seminal 
cases. 
1. Robinson 
On a street in Los Angeles, an officer noticed an individual whose arm 
had significant needle marks and scabs, consistent with repeated injection of 
narcotics from hypodermic needles. 181 The officer arrested the individual, 
Lawrence Robinson, for violating a state statute making it a misdemeanor for 
any person to be “addicted to the use of narcotics.”182 Robinson was not under 
the influence of narcotics at the time nor was he suffering from any 
withdrawal symptoms.183 But he admitted to using narcotics in the past.184 At 
the police station, another officer observed similar markings on Robinson’s 
arms.185 
A jury convicted Robinson, and an appeals court affirmed.186 But in 1962, 
the Supreme Court reversed.187 The Court expressed concern that the statute 
did not purport to cover any action (such as instant drug use or any antisocial 
conduct stemming from such use) nor did the statute refer the individual for 
medical treatment.188 Even if the statute criminalized conduct, “involuntary 
confinement” for purposes of treatment could be appropriate, the Court 
noted.189 Here, however, treatment was not ordered;190 instead, a violation of 
the statute carried a sentence of between ninety days and one year in county 
 
 179. See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 165, 194 (2006) (“[E]xcept in such rare cases, most addicts’ rational intervals are probably 
sufficiently rational to hold them largely or fully responsible for diminishing their own rationality at 
the time of use or other drug-related crimes.”). 
 180. See United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the insanity 
defense is not required as a matter of law when defendant only referenced addiction); United States 
v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that the insanity defense is not required as a 
matter of law when “testimony . . . does no more than express the idea that a narcotics addict may be 
influenced by his appetite for drugs to commit a crime to support his habit”). 
 181. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S 660, 661 (1962). 
 182. Id. at 660. 
 183. Id. at 662. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 661. 
 186. Id. at 663–64. 
 187. Id. at 668. 
 188. Id. at 666. 
 189. Id. at 665. 
 190. Id. 
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jail, with the possibility of probation of no more than five years.191 The Court 
also acknowledged that “addiction is an illness,” one that “may be contracted 
innocently or involuntarily,” such as through “medically prescribed narcotics” 
or a mother’s use during pregnancy.192 With this understanding, the Court 
held that the statutory provision amounted to cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
Justice Douglas, known incidentally to be a heavy drinker,193 concurred. 
He agreed that addiction is considered to be a “chronic disease” and a “mental 
or psychiatric disorder.”194 He suggested that punishing the individual with 
drug or alcohol disease in the hopes that they will “forsake their evil ways” is 
as foolish as punishing the insane as a method of reform or deterrence.195 
Indeed, Justice Douglas, citing a Senate Report, observed that “there is ‘a hard 
core’ of ‘chronic and incurable drug addicts who, in reality, have lost their 
power of self-control.’”196 As “[t]he addict is a sick person,” he surmised, the 
individual should be treated and may be confined for purposes of treatment.197 
Accordingly, it is cruel and unusual for a statute to “penaliz[e] an illness.”198 
Justice Harlan concurred as well, writing that “on the present state of 
medical knowledge,” California could “conclude that narcotics addiction is 
something other than an illness . . . .”199 In this case, however, Robinson was 
punished without committing any act and, instead, simply for being an 
individual with an addiction to narcotics in California.200 
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the statute does not reach “a person 
who acted without volition or who had lost the power of self-control,”201 but 
rather “applies to the incipient narcotic addict who retains self-control . . . .”202 
As to the application of the statute to the person who lacks self-control, Justice 
Clark noted that criminal law extends to status offenses, such as “drunkenness, 
which plainly is as involuntary after addiction to alcohol as is the taking of 
drugs.”203 The statute, according to Justice Clark, is justified by the legitimate 
goal of incapacitation as it seeks “to cure . . . by preventing further use.”204 
 
 191. Id. at 660–61 n.1. 
 192. Id. at 667. 
 193. See Posner, supra note 26. 
 194. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 672, 675 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 195. Id. at 669–70, 674. 
 196. Id. at 673. 
 197. Id. at 674. 
 198. Id. at 678. 
 199. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 680 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 681; see also id. at 684 (“The section at issue applies only to persons who use narcotics 
often or even daily but not to the point of losing self-control.”). 
 203. Id. at 684. 
 204. Id. at 681. 
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Justice Clark contended that addiction is “a condition commonly recognized as 
a threat to the State and to the individual”205 and that California legitimately 
“may attempt to deter and prevent . . . the grave threat of future harmful 
conduct” arising from addiction.206 Finally, Justice Clark pointed out that the 
defense did not dispute that Robinson’s addiction may be traced to his own 
actions.207 
Justice White also dissented, asserting that the statute was directed 
toward conduct, specifically “the regular, repeated or habitual use of 
narcotics.”208 But, critically, Justice White suggested that he may have voted 
differently if there was an indication that drug use was beyond Robinson’s 
control.209 “[I]f [Robinson] was convicted for being an addict who had lost his 
power of self-control,” Justice White hypothesized, “I would have other 
thoughts about this case.”210 The Supreme Court would address the subject of 
addiction and voluntariness only six years later. 
2. Powell 
Leroy Powell, a shoe shiner from Texas, drank wine daily and got drunk 
about once a week.211 When inebriated, Powell usually passed out in public.212 
He had been arrested approximately 100 times for public intoxication.213 In 
late December 1966, Powell was arrested again for public intoxication.214 
At trial, Powell claimed that he was “afflicted with the disease of chronic 
alcoholism,” that being drunk in public was “not of his own volition,” and 
that, as a result, “to punish him criminally for that conduct” would constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.215 In support of this contention, a psychiatrist 
testified that a “‘chronic alcoholic’ is an ‘involuntary drinker,’ who is 
‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his drinking.’”216 
Upon examining Powell, the psychiatrist concluded that Powell was a “chronic 
alcoholic” who, once intoxicated, “is not able to control his behavior” and who 
“reache[s] this point because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink.”217 
That said, the psychiatrist acknowledged that, while sober, Powell could 
differentiate between right and wrong and that Powell’s decision to take the 
 
 205. Id. at 679. 
 206. Id. at 683. 
 207. Id. at 684. 
 208. Id. at 686 (White, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 555 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 517 (plurality opinion). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 518. 
 217. Id. 
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first drink was a “voluntary exercise of his will.” 218 Despite his drinking 
history and related criminal record, Powell never received treatment.219 
The morning of trial, Powell admitted to having a single drink before the 
proceedings started. 220 The prosecution suggested that Powell’s ability to 
refrain from having any additional drinks demonstrated that Powell could 
exercise sufficient willpower to not become intoxicated. 221  The defense 
countered with the theory that Powell had only one drink because he only had 
enough money—he only made about $12 a week—for that one drink.222 
The trial court found that “chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys 
the afflicted person’s will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption 
of alcohol,” that “a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own 
volition,” and that Powell “is a chronic alcoholic who is afflicted with the 
disease of chronic alcoholism.”223 But the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, 
that chronic alcoholism was not a defense to the charge.224 The trial court 
therefore upheld the conviction.225 
If Robinson forbids states from punishing status, the Supreme Court in 
Powell addressed the question left open by Robinson, namely whether conduct 
that is symptomatic of addiction may not be punished either, “because it is, in 
some sense, ‘involuntary’ . . . .”226 In an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, a plurality of four Justices of the Supreme Court recognized the 
“widespread agreement today that ‘alcoholism’ is a ‘disease . . . .’”227 There was 
no consensus, however, as to what this medical determination meant for legal 
purposes, the plurality acknowledged.228 Compounding the uncertainty, the 
plurality noted, were the different types of individuals with alcoholism and 
different manifestations of problem drinking.229 Citing the work of leading 
disease-model scholar E. Morton Jellinek, the plurality suggested that 
addiction possibly could bar criminal liability if an individual could not stop 
picking up a drink in the first place or drank to avert withdrawal.230 
Applying this understanding of addiction to Powell’s situation, the 
plurality took account of the fact that he was capable of stopping after having 
just one drink, the psychiatrist’s testimony that the taking of the initial drink 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 556 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. at 519 (plurality opinion). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 520. 
 223. Id. at 521. 
 224. Id. at 517. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 533. 
 227. Id. at 522. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 522–23. 
 230. Id. at 525. 
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is a product of free will, and the fact that Powell was not in a state of 
withdrawal.231 The plurality held that the Texas statute did not run afoul of 
Robinson because Powell “was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but 
for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion.”232 Put differently, 
Texas “has not sought to punish a mere status” or a condition but rather “it 
has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for public behavior.”233 The 
plurality clarified that Robinson stands only for the proposition that, in the 
context of addiction, criminal punishment must apply to an act.234 
Justice White concurred.235 Picking up on his dissent in Robinson, Justice 
White declared that “the use of narcotics by an addict must be beyond the 
reach of the criminal law. Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible 
urge to consume alcohol should not be punishable for drinking or for being 
drunk.”236 Therefore, if “a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness 
is impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is also 
impossible,” the statute would be unconstitutional, he determined.237 But here, 
Justice White concluded that Powell was able to control or manage where he 
was drinking—even if he could not control his drinking itself: “[Powell] made 
no showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in 
question.” 238  Moreover, Justice White did not believe that the record 
supported Powell’s contention that Powell was compelled to drink due to an 
addiction to alcohol.239 Accordingly, Justice White voted to affirm Powell’s 
conviction.240 
Four Justices dissented.241 Their opinion, authored by Justice Fortas, 
began by noting that under the prevailing disease model “alcoholism is caused 
and maintained by something other than the moral fault of the alcoholic” and 
instead is “something that . . . cannot be controlled by him.”242 Justice Fortas 
interpreted Robinson to stand for a principle that “[c]riminal penalties may not 
be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 532. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 533. Powell therefore overruled any prior, lower federal court rulings inconsistent with 
this holding, such as Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). Cf. at 764 (“[O]ur excusal of the 
chronic alcoholic from criminal prosecution is confined exclusively to those acts on his part which are 
compulsive as symptomatic of the disease. With respect to other behavior—not characteristic of 
confirmed chronic alcoholism—he would be judged as would any person not so afflicted.”). 
 235. Id. at 548–49 (White, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 551 (emphasis added). 
 238. Id. at 554. 
 239. Id. at 549 n.1. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 242. Id. at 561.  
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change.”243 While Robinson “elected to take narcotics,” Justice Fortas asserted, 
“[o]nce Robinson had become an addict, he was utterly powerless to avoid 
criminal guilt.”244 “He was powerless to choose not to violate the law,” he 
emphasized. 245 Justice Fortas agreed that the statute at issue in Robinson 
punished status, whereas the statute at issue in Powell punished conduct.246 
“But the essential constitutional defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in 
both cases the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which 
he had no capacity to change or avoid.”247 For Powell, when he took his first 
drink, he became compelled to drink “to the point of intoxication; and that, 
once intoxicated, he could not prevent himself from appearing in public 
places,”248 the dissent concluded. As intoxication and being intoxicated in 
public were “characteristic and involuntary” symptoms of alcoholism, Powell 
could not, under the dissent’s theory, be punished for these acts. 249 
Accordingly, the dissenting justices would have held that the Texas statute as 
applied to Powell constituted cruel and unusual punishment.250 
C. Two Models 
Robinson and Powell have produced two competing interpretations as to 
when and whether an individual with an addiction may be held criminally 
responsible for conduct that is symptomatic of the addiction. The analytical 
distinction between the two is highlighted in Manning v. Caldwell,251 a 2019 
case in which the Fourth Circuit split in a deeply divided 8–7 en banc 
opinion.252 This section therefore draws upon this recent decision to help 
illuminate the difference between the two camps. 
1. The Status-Conduct Distinction 
The traditional reading of the Robinson-Powell guideposts is that the 
government may impose criminal punishment on an individual for their 
alcohol- or drug-related conduct, but not for their status as an individual with 
an addiction. Under this bright-line reading, the flaw in the California statute 
at issue in Robinson was that the statute lacked any actus reus, or evil act, a 
cornerstone of Anglo-American criminal law. As the statute in Powell 
 
 243. Id. at 567. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 567–68. 
 248. Id. at 568. 
 249. Id. at 559 n.2. 
 250. Id. at 569–70. 
 251. 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 252. Id. at 286. 
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contained an actus reus, this argument goes, the statute did not run afoul of 
the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Robinson. 
Most federal circuits have adopted this straightforward status-conduct 
distinction. The First Circuit put it flatly: “Proof that one acts due to 
addiction . . . is not proof that one acts involuntarily.”253 The Second Circuit 
wrote that “[a]n addict who commits an affirmative illegal act, as distinguished 
from one whose only anti-social behavior is the mere presence of his 
addiction, may be constitutionally punished.”254 The Fifth Circuit similarly 
observed that “mere alcoholism does not constitute a mental disease or defect” 
excusing one from criminal responsibility.255 Along the same lines, the Eighth 
Circuit interpreted Powell to “h[o]ld that chronic alcoholics could properly be 
required to control their actions to the extent necessary to avoid collision with 
the criminal law . . . .” 256  For its part, the Eleventh Circuit noted, “The 
considerations that make any incarceration unconstitutional when a statute 
punishes a defendant for his status are not applicable when the government 
seeks to punish a person’s actions,”257 adding in a subsequent case that the 
statute at issue in Powell was “constitutionally permissible because it 
punishe[d] an act, ‘being in public while drunk on a particular occasion,’ not a 
status, ‘being a chronic alcoholic.’”258 In a case producing a set of extensive 
opinions, the D.C. Circuit characterized Robinson and Powell as holding that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal law from punishing the mere 
craving for alcohol but enables states to prohibit “the acts which give in to that 
craving,” as such acts are not the product of “irresistible compulsion, or [the] 
loss of self-control.”259 
2. The Categorical-Involuntary Model 
In Manning, the Fourth Circuit broke with its sister courts in declining 
to follow the status-conduct distinction of Robinson and Powell.260 The case 
arose out of a Virginia statute that criminalized the use or possession of 
alcohol by anyone who has a prior intoxication offense or who “has shown 
 
 253. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 875 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 
535). 
 254. Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 255. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 245 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Powell, 392 U.S. at 
535). 
 256. United States v. Lame, 716 F.2d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion)). 
 257. United States v. Benefield, 889 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 258. Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 
U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (plurality opinion)). 
 259. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 260. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 285–86 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021) 
2021] CRIMINAL LAW x ADDICTION 1117 
himself to be an habitual drunkard.”261 The challengers, homeless individuals 
who claimed to have an addiction to alcohol, contended that “they face an 
irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public.” 262  The 
government-defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which the district 
court granted.263 A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed, pointing out that 
“[t]here was no majority holding [in Powell] that nonvolitional conduct could 
invariably be criminalized” and that Justice White’s decisive concurrence in 
Powell left open the question of whether behavioral compulsion can negate 
criminal responsibility.264 The panel echoed and affirmed the status-conduct 
distinction, noting that “although states may not criminalize status, they may 
criminalize actual behavior even when the individual alleges that addiction 
created a strong urge to engage in a particular act.”265 The panel therefore 
rejected the constitutional challenge.266 
The full Fourth Circuit reheard the case267 and reversed by an 8–7 
vote.268 The en banc majority asserted that, in Powell, Justice White “expressly 
rejected the act-status rationale adopted by the plurality . . . .”269 According to 
the majority, Justice White “voted to affirm Powell’s conviction not because of 
the act-status theory relied on by the [Powell] plurality, but solely because 
Powell had not produced facts establishing the involuntariness of his public 
alcoholism.” 270  The majority concluded that Justice White’s involuntary-
voluntary distinction was shared by the four dissenting Justices in Powell, and 
thus is the operative standard to assess the constitutionality of criminal 
statutes applying to individuals with an addiction.271 Here, the majority held 
that Virginia could not criminalize behavior that is symptomatic of an illness, 
 
 261. Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-
333(A) (1993) (amended 2020)), reh’g granted, 741 F. App’x 937 (2018) (mem.), vacated, 930 F.3d 
264 (2019). 
 262. Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868, 876–77 (W.D. Va. 2017) (quoting Powell v. 
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion)), vacated sub nom., Manning v. Caldwell, 930 
F.3d 264 (2019). 
 263. Id. at 895. 
 264. Manning, 900 F.3d at 146–47. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 153. Following Manning, the Harvard Law Review published a comment, arguing that, 
“[p]unishing a homeless alcoholic for consuming alcohol is the same as punishing an alcoholic for being 
an alcoholic because, by definition, alcoholics cannot control their alcohol intake unless they are in 
recovery or recovered.” Recent Cases, Plurality Decisions — The Marks Rule — Fourth Circuit Declines 
To Apply Justice White’s Concurrence in Powell v. Texas as Binding Precedent. — Manning v. Caldwell, 
900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2019) (emphasis added).  
 267. Manning v. Caldwell, 741 F. App’x 937 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.). 
 268. Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 269. Id. at 280 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548–49 (1968) (White, J., concurring)). 
 270. Id. at 282 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 549 n.1 (1968) (White, J., concurring)) 
(emphasis in original). 
 271. Id. at 280. 
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where the underlying behavior is otherwise legal.272 As the case rose to the 
appeals court on a motion to dismiss, the majority accepted the plaintiffs’ bare 
allegations—that drinking is compelled by their addiction to alcohol—as 
true.273 
The opinion provoked a stinging dissent authored by Judge Wilkinson 
and joined by five of his colleagues.274 Judge Wilkinson, reflecting the status-
conduct distinction, asserted that “the criminal law cannot punish who you 
are; it can only punish what you do.”275 Accordingly, “although states may not 
criminalize status, they may criminalize actual behavior even when the 
individual alleges that addiction created a strong urge to engage in a particular 
act,” he explained.276 
Judge Wilkinson acknowledged that in his Powell concurrence Justice 
White questioned “whether conduct compelled by addiction might be 
protected under Robinson.”277 But the dissent observed that Justice White 
sided with the plurality because “Powell’s behavior involved a volitional act,” 
specifically whether he was in public.278 The dissent noted therefore that 
Justice White “chose to resolve the case without reaching the broader question 
of compulsion,” leaving Robinson’s status-conduct distinction “undisturbed.”279 
Judge Wilkinson emphasized that “Justice White concurred in this judgment 
because the statute in question involved an act that was clearly volitional, 
forestalling the need to examine whether and under what conditions 
nonvolitional conduct might be constitutionally shielded from criminal 
sanctions.”280 Any speculation from Justice White about whether criminal law 
can reach compelled conduct constitutes mere dicta, the dissent concluded.281 
The dissent further argued that the compelled-conduct exception to 
criminal law limitation is not only unsupported, but is also unworkable;282 
there is no reliable standard to assess which conduct is compelled and 
therefore placed outside of the bounds of the criminal law.283 The majority’s 
 
 272. Id. at 285; see also id. (“In sum, we hold that the challenged Virginia statutory scheme is 
unconstitutionally vague, and that even assuming it could be limited to those suffering from 
alcoholism, Plaintiffs have stated an Eighth Amendment claim under both Robinson and Powell.”). 
 273. Id. at 282. 
 274. Id. at 286 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Diaz filed a separate dissenting opinion, id. at 
306 (Diaz, J., dissenting), bringing the total number of dissenting judges to seven. 
 275. Id. at 288 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 292 (“[T]here must be some behavioral 
link set forth in the law.”). 
 276. Id. at 290–91. 
 277. Id. at 289. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id.; see also id. at 290 (“[T]he Powell decision does not overturn or in any way disrupt 
Robinson.”). 
 280. Id. at 290. 
 281. Id. at 291. 
 282. Id. at 286–87. 
 283. Id. at 291. 
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limiting principle of confining its rule to otherwise lawful conduct, the dissent 
suggested, is inconsistent with the criminal law’s traditional acceptance of 
legislatures barring certain classes of people, such as recidivists, from engaging 
in specific behavior that others can.284 
The Ninth Circuit also appears to have moved away from the status-
conduct camp. For years, and on a repeated basis, the Ninth Circuit followed 
the status-conduct approach. In one case, that court held that, under Robinson, 
it is unconstitutional to “criminalize[] the status of being addicted to 
narcotics,” and that Powell “subsequently limited the applicability of Robinson 
to crimes that do not involve an actus reus . . . .”285 In another, the court 
rejected a challenge to the application of a criminal statute, reasoning that the 
defendant “is not being punished because he has [certain] status,” but rather 
“he is being punished for having committed the [proscribed] act . . . .”286 In a 
third, the court refused to accept a defendant’s generous construction of 
Powell, explaining with reference to Powell that the defendant’s “conduct 
rather than his status as an alcoholic led to his confinement.”287 Shortly after 
Powell, the court concluded that, even if there was evidence that the defendant 
“was a chronic alcoholic in the sense that he could not prevent himself from 
drinking,” he would not be “excused . . . from criminal responsibility under 
the present state of the law.”288 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit started showing signs of breaking from the 
prevailing status-conduct interpretation of Robinson and Powell when the court 
reviewed a challenge, brought by homeless individuals who could not obtain 
shelter, against a Los Angeles ordinance that criminalized the sitting, lying, or 
sleeping on public streets or sidewalks within city limits. 289  The court 
invalidated the ordinance, holding, as the en banc Fourth Circuit did, that 
Justice White’s concurring opinion in Powell and the opinion of four 
dissenting Justices together “stand for the proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or 
condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.”290 The 
opinion was later vacated, however, when the parties to the action settled.291 
 
 284. Id. at 296. 
 285. United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425–26 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 
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 286. United States v. Parga-Rosas, 238 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 287. Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 
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 288. Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 736 n.9 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 
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 289. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit in 2018 considered a challenge, 
brought by homeless individuals unable to obtain shelter, to the 
constitutionality of a Boise ordinance that criminalized sleeping outside in 
public within city limits.292 The court stated that, though it was not bound by 
the vacated 2006 opinion, it nonetheless was persuaded by its reasoning.293 
Applying the standard cobbled together from the Powell concurring and 
dissenting opinions, the Ninth Circuit determined that sleeping in public was 
an unavoidable consequence of the defendants’ status as homeless individuals, 
as the city had run out of beds for the homeless, and thus homeless individuals 
had no option but to sleep outside.294 
The case was referred for possible en banc review and in 2019 the full 
court declined to rehear the case.295 But six judges dissented from the denial of 
en banc review, indicating a strong disagreement with the panel opinion’s 
apparent departure from the status-conduct distinction. 296  Judge Smith, 
writing for the six dissenting judges, expressly charged that the panel 
misinterpreted Powell.297 The appropriate way to apply Powell, he argued, was 
not to combine the concurrence and dissent into a quasi-holding, but to 
identify the narrow, substantive overlap between the concurrence and 
plurality opinions.298 The Powell concurrence and plurality agreed, the dissent 
argued, that Powell’s “conviction was constitutional because it involved the 
commission of an act. Nothing more, nothing less.”299 As the dissent could not 
convince enough judges to revisit the panel opinion, the pathbreaking 
approach adopted by the panel opinion remains the law of the circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach may signal a deeper split among the 
federal circuits on the meaning of Robinson and Powell, and specifically 
whether and when conduct may be deemed involuntary for purposes of 
criminal law. While the Ninth Circuit’s interpretations of Robinson and Powell 
arise in the context of homelessness, not addiction, its reasoning applies to the 
addiction context, and there is no basis to suspect that the rationale adopted 
by the Circuit is limited to matters of homelessness. 
*    *    * 
Courts and scholars agree that Robinson prohibits the government from 
imposing criminal liability on an individual for having the status of an 
 
 292. Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 920 
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individual with drug or alcohol disease. Accordingly, being an individual with 
drug or alcohol disease or having the condition of addiction cannot be the 
basis, by itself, for the imposition of criminal liability. The unanimity stops 
there. Most circuits hold that, under Powell, no constitutional issue arises from 
the imposition of criminal punishment for an actus reus, such as being 
intoxicated, even if the actus reus is symptomatic of an addiction, such as an 
addiction to alcohol.300 But under the emerging minority view—championed 
by the Fourth Circuit and joined perhaps by the Ninth—Powell stands for the 
principle that an action compelled by addiction is not voluntary and criminal 
liability predicated on that compelled action is thus inappropriate. In the next 
part, I argue that both models are flawed, and I propose an alternative that is 
more legally and clinically sound. 
III. AN INDIVIDUALIZED, EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This part argues that the two competing interpretations of Powell—the 
majority view that an individual with an addiction can be punished for 
conduct and the emerging view that an individual with drug or alcohol disease 
cannot be punished for nonvolitional conduct—are both wrong. First, Justice 
White voted to uphold Powell’s conviction because the statute applied to 
volitional conduct and because Powell could not show that his conduct was not 
volitional. The status-conduct approach, asking only whether a statute 
criminalizes conduct irrespective of its volitional character, therefore is wrong 
because it focuses only on the presence of an actus reus and denies the 
individual the opportunity to make a particularized showing that criminal 
liability is not appropriate. Second, while the Fourth Circuit adopted the 
correct understanding of Justice White’s concurring opinion, it mistakenly 
treated all individuals with an addiction as categorically immune from 
criminal responsibility. As Justice White’s opinion and addiction-related 
sources such as medical studies, twelve-step literature, addiction treatment 
programs, and drug court programs indicate, an individual with an addiction 
to drugs or alcohol can exercise choice as to whether to address the addiction. 
Therefore, courts should probe whether, according to the facts—not merely 
the label of addiction—the individual with an addiction could exercise that 
choice. The Fourth Circuit did not examine these individualized conditions, 
looking instead to the diagnosis alone as a shield to criminal liability. 
This part therefore argues in favor of a third, evidentiary model in which 
an individual with an addiction must prove that addressing the addiction was 
 
 300. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that an addiction 
defense under Powell would result in a “multitude of acts which are now crimes” being “excused if 
[such] defense w[as] accepted”); Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 289–90 (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases holding that punishment for unlawful conduct resulting from drug and 
alcohol disease is not unconstitutional). 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2021) 
1122 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-4 
not possible and therefore lacks the culpability or blameworthiness necessary 
for criminal liability to attach. It outlines what this showing would entail and 
further explains that this showing is a difficult one. As such, the defense to 
liability is commensurately narrow. 
A. Conduct and Choice 
The Marks Rule. The general response to the question of whether and 
when an individual with an addiction may be held criminally responsible for 
acts symptomatic of the addiction boils down to a more specific question: 
How should courts properly interpret the fractured plurality opinion in 
Powell? It appears undisputed that Justice White’s opinion is controlling. The 
dispute instead centers on the precedential standard to be extracted from that 
opinion. The courts are right to look to Justice White’s concurring opinion; 
the Supreme Court’s Marks v. United States301 rule instructs courts, in the 
event of a plurality opinion, to give effect to the concurring opinion’s overlap 
with the plurality opinion.302 The Supreme Court’s ruling in University of 
California Regents v. Bakke 303 —concerning the constitutionality of race-
conscious admissions—offers a helpful example of the application of the Marks 
principle. In Bakke, the Court issued a plurality opinion.304 Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion, which supplied the fifth vote for the judgment, is 
understood to be the controlling opinion in the case.305 Whereas the plurality 
found four compelling state interests to justify the admissions system at issue, 
Justice Powell accepted only one such reason; it is only that one reason that 
has any precedential value moving forward because it is the only overlap 
between the plurality and the concurring opinion.306 
Here, most circuits are incorrect to interpret Justice White’s concurrence 
in Powell as the basis for a binding status-conduct distinction. It is true that 
the plurality in Powell strictly followed Robinson’s status-conduct distinction 
and therefore asked only whether the statute criminalized Powell for being an 
individual with drug or alcohol disease (status) or whether it criminalized an 
actus reus (conduct).307 The statute contained two actions—1) being drunk and 
 
 301. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 302. See id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (plurality opinion))). 
 303. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 304. Id. at 267–68.  
 305. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003). 
 306. See id. 
 307. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
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2) being drunk outside—and for the plurality, the existence of an actus reus 
was sufficient to distinguish Powell’s case from Robinson.308 
If Justice White agreed with the status-conduct distinction, he would 
have upgraded the 4–1–4 plurality into a 5–4 majority.309 But Justice White’s 
exploration of whether Powell had shown that he was unable to control these 
two actions demonstrates that he was not only concerned with whether Powell 
had committed an identifiable actus reus. Rather, his opinion and vote to 
uphold the constitutionality of the conviction hinged entirely on the absence 
of this showing. Indeed, it was dispositive to Justice White that Powell failed 
to prove that he had no choice to be outside.310 This reading of Justice White’s 
opinion is also faithful to his dissent in Robinson. There, Justice White 
suggested that his vote may have changed if Robinson “was convicted for 
being an addict who had lost his power of self-control . . . .”311 
Justice White indicated that the other relevant conduct, being drunk, 
could be involuntary too.312 This speculation about compelled use itself may 
be set aside as dicta.313 But the importance of the voluntary nature of Powell’s 
location to Justice White’s opinion demonstrates that Justice White looked 
deeper than the status-conduct distinction to ensure specifically that the 
criminalized conduct was voluntary. Under Marks, Justice White’s 
voluntariness requirement serves as the narrowest grounds, and thus the 
controlling standard, because it restricts the universe of what may be 
criminalized from any conduct (plurality view) to voluntary conduct 
(concurring view),314 much in the same way that Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Bakke limited the universe of acceptable reasons for affirmative 
action from four to one.315 
Importance of Voluntariness. As a matter of first principles, insisting that 
an individual’s conduct is voluntary prior to the imposition of criminal 
penalties is most sensible. It is a basic assumption of criminal law that 
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individuals possess the capacity both to understand the limits on conduct 
established by law and to conform their conduct accordingly.316 Criminal 
liability, therefore, is predicated on the choice by the individual to step 
beyond the boundaries of lawful conduct; without such choice, the individual 
is not suited to criminal punishment. Justice White’s approach—
contemplating the possibility that the conduct of the individual with drug or 
alcohol disease is not truly voluntary—pays tribute to the foundational 
requirement that criminal liability follows individual agency. 
Therefore, the majority view is wrong to ask only whether criminal 
punishment attaches to an actus reus. Instead, the courts should ensure that 
the relevant conduct is voluntary. In this respect, the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits are correct to focus on whether the relevant actions are voluntary and 
not only whether the statute proscribes some cognizable action. 
The Evidentiary Approach in Criminal Law. The individualized inquiry 
contemplated by Justice White is not uncommon in the criminal context. The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, considered an argument that a defendant “is 
immune from prosecution [for receiving, distributing, and possessing child 
pornography] because as a pedophile or ephebophile he is compelled to 
collect, receive and distribute child pornography.”317 The court did not accept 
the bald assertion that the defendant’s disease rendered the relevant conduct 
beyond his control. Rather, the court noted that, even if the defendant “is a 
pedophile and/or ephebophile and . . . his receipt, distribution and possession 
of child pornography ‘was a pathological symptom of [his] pedophilia and/or 
ephebophilia,’” the defendant “did not show that this charged conduct was 
involuntary or uncontrollable.”318 The facts proved the opposite; according to 
psychological reports, the “defendant could control his impulses to access child 
pornography,” irrespective of the claim that he had an associated disease.319 
Thus, there is existing support in the criminal context for the proposition that 
a disease alone does not determine whether prohibited conduct is voluntary. 
The dispositive question instead, as reflected in Justice White’s concurrence 
and the Seventh Circuit opinion, is whether the defendant can nonetheless 
prove that the unlawful conduct is involuntary in light of their individual 
circumstances. 
B. Addiction and Choice 
For its part, the Fourth Circuit categorically equates the status of 
addiction with compulsion to drink or use.320 In doing so, it assumes that all 
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individuals with drug or alcohol disease are categorically incapable of 
exercising choice as to drinking or using.321 This assumption is wrong. Medical 
literature, twelve-step fellowship programs, substance use disorder programs, 
and drug court programs all support the proposition that an individual with 
drug or alcohol disease can be capable of choice and thus may be the proper 
subject of criminal sanction. 
As a threshold matter, the involuntary acquisition of a disease, for which 
the individual lacks any blameworthiness, does not negate the responsibility to 
exercise choice once the disease is acquired. On the contrary, an individual is 
blameworthy for failing to fulfill that responsibility. As further explained 
below, the existence of the disease does not mean that the individual with an 
addiction lacks awareness of the adverse manifestations of the disease; lacks 
the opportunity or duty to address the disease; lacks workable options to 
address the disease; is automatically compelled to drink or use; is categorically 
compelled to drink or use; or is to be defined by the label of the disease rather 
than by that awareness, opportunity, viable options, or individual 
circumstances. 
Irrelevance of Involuntary Acquisition. Under the disease model of 
addiction, the individual is not to blame for having an alcohol or substance use 
disorder.322 But the involuntary acquisition of the disease does not render the 
individual categorically incapable of addressing the disease and its adverse 
manifestations. As noted by Dr. David Linden, a neurologist at Johns 
Hopkins University, “The development of an addiction is not the addict’s 
fault”; however, “believing that addiction is a disease does not absolve addicts 
from responsibility for their own recovery.” 323 “It’s not a free ride,” he 
added.324 
Capacity for Conscious Awareness. An individual with alcohol or drug 
disease can form a conscious awareness that their drinking or use is 
problematic and therefore warrants a corrective response. Twelve-step 
fellowship programs note that the individual with an addiction may be 
conscious of the troubling nature of drinking or using, even while drinking or 
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using. Indeed, the AA’s’ “Big Book” references an individual with drug or 
alcohol disease who reveals, “I was having these little moments of clarity, 
times I knew for sure that I was an alcoholic. Times when I was looking at the 
bottom of my glass asking myself, Why am I doing this?”325 The very first 
step in the twelve-steps is an admission that the individual’s life has become 
“unmanageable” due to alcohol. 326 This admission necessarily requires an 
awareness of both the destructive impact of alcohol and the source of that 
destruction, namely alcohol. The individual’s tremendous capacity for guilt 
and shame further reinforces the individual’s capacity for reflection as to the 
negative consequences of drinking or using.327 
Drug treatment programs likewise link conscious thought to drinking or 
using. Take, for instance, the conceptualization of relapse by a well-
established treatment facility in the Washington, DC, area, which notes that 
relapse is preceded by prior thoughts rationalizing the drinking or use, beliefs 
that drinking or use will be pleasurable, and ultimately permission to drink or 
use.328 A federal court similarly reasoned that, even if an individual with 
addiction lacks control while intoxicated, “such substance abusers are not 
regarded as deprived of free will for offenses committed during ‘lucid’ 
intervals.” 329  Unless the individual is in a state of fixed insanity, these 
intervals serve as opportunities for the individual to reflect and resolve to 
address the illness.330 
The Duty to Mitigate. Alcohol and drug use impose significant costs on 
the individual and society at large. Consider that, in a twelve-month period 
ending in May of 2020, over 81,000 individuals died of a drug-related 
overdose. 331  Similarly, the estimated economic impact of the opioid 
epidemic—including deaths, health care costs, and criminal justice 
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expenditures—is $179 billion in one year.332 In addition, drunk driving vehicle 
accidents cause over 10,000 deaths per year in the United States, an average of 
one death every 50 minutes.333 These deaths and associated costs, according to 
the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, impose a yearly 
financial cost of $44 billion.334 The human toll of addiction and overdoses 
cannot be ignored or understated. Judge Marielsa Bernard, whose daughter 
died of an overdose, shares: “You go through hell when you have an addicted 
child because you just never know what’s gonna happen—they become 
someone you don’t really know . . . . After they die, you’re in hell still, but it’s 
a different kind of hell.”335 As these figures and words indicate, alcohol and 
drug use can kill individuals, destroy families, and unleash significant personal 
and financial costs on society. 
Conscious awareness of alcohol and drug use permits awareness of the 
consequences—both actual and potential—of that use. An individual who is 
consciously aware of their alcohol or drug use has an affirmative moral and 
social duty to address those consequences. In the very first step in the twelve 
steps of AA, the individual admits that they alone are “powerless” over 
alcohol.336 Though the individual by themselves is powerless as to alcohol, AA 
explains that the individual is “not powerless over assuming responsibility for 
[her] own recovery.”337 
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For an individual with an addiction to avert this responsibility because 
their addiction is a disease or was involuntarily acquired would be to shift the 
costs of the action away from the individual and onto society; thus, an 
individual would be free to leave a disease unaddressed. We would not want 
an individual in active addiction to hurt themselves or others any more than 
we would want an individual with poor eyesight to walk around without 
glasses or contacts and wander into traffic, or worse. The disability context is 
instructive: if an individual does not take such responsive efforts, “it is wholly 
proper to say that [their] disability flows, not from the disease or injury itself” 
but from the “voluntary failure or refusal to take the available corrective or 
ameliorative action.”338 Similarly, there is no reason to exempt an individual 
with drug or alcohol disease wholesale from the responsibility to offset the 
problematic manifestations of the addiction. Leading criminal law theorist 
Sanford Kadish explained that the disease of addiction does not negate that 
responsibility: 
To find that criminal conduct is causally related to persistent patterns 
of behavior which are to some extent medically treatable (for this is 
what sickness here presumably connotes) does not establish that 
punishment is unjust. Being ’sick’ in this sense does not mean or imply 
that the person is irresponsible and not morally culpable. Just as a 
psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness does not itself establish a defense 
of legal insanity, neither does a diagnosis of addiction establish that the 
addict is not responsible for his actions.339 
Fulfilling the Duty To Mitigate. Individuals with addiction to drugs or 
alcohol can and do take action to convert the conscious desire to address the 
disease into “efforts” to address the disease.340 Those efforts include seeking 
and obtaining treatment. “Research shows that treatment can help drug-
addicted individuals stop drug use, avoid relapse and successfully recover their 
lives.”341 The corrective efforts can also include participation in fellowship 
programs.342 According to one report, over one million Americans are part of 
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ultimate control over it—for good or ill.”).  
 338. Baker v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 782 F.2d 993, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
 339. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 286 (1987).  
 340. DSM-5, supra note 133, at 490. 
 341. What Is a Substance Use Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Dec. 2020), https:// 
www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/addiction/what-is-addiction [https://perma.cc/T7TT-MSQ4].  
 342. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80, at 25. Twelve-step programs tout themselves as 
the most reliable means by which to eliminate the adverse impact of addiction and to achieve a life of 
sobriety, health, and freedom. See THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at 58; Effectiveness of 12 
Step Programs, BURNING TREE (2019), https://www.burningtree.com/effectiveness-12-step-programs/ 
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AA,343 each person serving as proof that those with the disease can and do 
respond to the disease. This approach can be effective. Indeed, a little-known 
fact is that the original name for the AA text was “The Way Out,” 344 
reflecting fellowship-based recovery as a viable means of transitioning from 
active addiction to sobriety.345 
Distinguishing Between Addiction and Involuntariness. That individuals with 
alcohol or drug disease may be aware of their actions and that there are viable 
options to address the disease cut against the notion that individual drinking 
or using automatically or categorically rises to the level of a cognizable 
compulsion. Professors Richard Holton and Kent Berridge write that “the 
brain of an addict is importantly different from that of a normal nonaddicted 
individual” and that “once addiction is under way, the desire for the addictive 
drug takes on a life of its own, with an intensity that is particularly, perhaps 
uniquely, high.”346 But this fact, they point out, should not be equated with 
involuntary conduct: “[T]he intensity and power of addictive desires do[es] 
not mean that addicts are automata, standing powerless spectators as they are 
moved by their desires.”347 
The traditional bar for involuntariness is particularly high. Indeed, in 
ordinary criminal law, involuntariness exists where the actus reus is a reflexive 
or conditioned response to external stimuli. 348  A classic illustration of 
involuntariness is the war veteran who responds unconsciously to stressful 
situations. 349 What sets these instances of involuntariness apart from the 
 
[https://perma.cc/BD9P-CP55] (“Research shows that that most effective plan is one that includes a 
treatment program followed by participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) . . . .”); Michael Miller, 
The Relevance of Twelve-Step Recovery in 21st Century Addiction Medicine, AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION 
MED. (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.asam.org/resources/publications/magazine/read/article/2015/ 
02/13/the-relevance-of-twelve-step-recovery-in-21st-century-addiction-medicine [https://perma.cc/ 
XD4P-47LL] (“Twelve Step Facilitation therapy is still a tried-and-true proven approach. It is far 
more than advising a patient to ‘go to AA’ and providing them a list of meeting locations and 
times.”). 
 343. Katy Steinmetz, AA Around the World, TIME (Jul. 2, 2010), http://content.time.com/ 
time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2001284_2001057_2001044,00.html [https://perma.cc/V59W-
HEZL]. 
 344. See DAILY REFLECTIONS, supra note 121, at Nov. 25 (explaining that the original title was 
discarded once it was discovered that books with similar titles were on the market). 
 345. See THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at 58 (“Rarely have we seen a person fail who has 
thoroughly followed our path.”). 
 346. Richard Holton & Kent Berridge, Addiction Between Compulsion and Choice, in ADDICTION 
AND SELF-CONTROL: PERSPECTIVES FROM PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND NEUROSCIENCE 
239, 241 (Neil Levy ed., 2013).  
 347. Id. at 242.  
 348. LAFAVE, supra note 171, § 9.4. 
 349. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 538 P.2d 829, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (“On the witness stand 
Mr. Perkins recalled all of the incidents which led up to the shooting . . . but ‘then everything went 
black.’ His next recollection is walking to a vehicle accompanied by a deputy sheriff.”); State v. 
Utter, 479 P.2d 946, 947–48 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (“Conditioned response was defined by [a 
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addiction context is that the former do not involve conscious awareness of the 
conduct: the body responds while the individual is unconscious or before there 
is any deliberation or opportunity to deliberate.350 For the individual with 
drug or alcohol disease, by contrast, the underlying conduct may be 
appreciated.351 Consistent with this general understanding and the concept of 
lucid intervals, Professor Kadish explained: 
[T]he characteristic actions of an addict could hardly be made to fit [the 
meaning of an involuntary act]. They are movements he chooses to 
make to achieve his purposes and therefore have nothing in common 
with falling or being pushed or with reflexive or convulsive movements, 
or even with sleepwalking or hypnotic movements. There is a 
substantial difference between those movements and the complex and 
varied activities involved in obtaining and using alcohol and other 
drugs. There are enough conscious, purposive actions in the 
characteristic behavior of addicts (including abstinence when the 
motivation is great enough) that it cannot possibly be considered 
involuntary.352 
Because conduct that is symptomatic of the addiction can be voluntary, it 
may be properly punished. Take for example drug courts, generally specialized 
courts that promote treatment of defendants charged with nonviolent conduct 
that stems from their drinking or use.353 In drug court, jail is a common 
sanction for a program participant who relapses while in the program. The 
National Drug Court Institute notes that “Drug Courts typically administer a 
gradually escalating sequence of consequences for substance use. The earliest 
consequences often involve enhancing treatment services, whereas later 
consequences may include punitive sanctions of increasing severity.”354 Some 
 
psychiatrist at trial] as ‘an act or a pattern of activity occurring so rapidly, so uniformly as to be 
automatic in response to certain stimulus.’ [Appellant] testified that as a result of his jungle warfare 
training and experiences in World War II, he had on two occasions in the 1950’s reacted violently 
towards people approaching him unexpectedly from the rear.”). 
 350. See LAFAVE, supra note 171, § 6.1(c) (defining a voluntary act as one in which the “mind has 
quickly grasped the situation and dictated some action”). 
 351. See supra notes 325–30 and accompanying text. 
 352. Kadish, supra note 339, at 286–87.  
 353. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION COURT 
PROGRAMS 5 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research 
-publications/2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D3B-9A3K].  
 354. DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 101 FOR 
DRUG COURTS: MAKING THE MOST OF INCENTIVES AND SANCTIONS 5 (2012); see also RYAN S. 
KING & JILL PASQARELLA, THE SENT’G PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
4 (2009) (“A participant who is non-compliant with any of the drug court protocols can be sanctioned 
through a variety of means, including increased status hearings, drug tests or jail time. . . . [F]or 
persons who have violated the terms of their drug court sentence by relapsing, . . . a judge can . . . 
impos[e] some type of sanction, including a brief period of incarceration.”); cf. Mike Riggs, Want To 
Go to Drug Court? Say Goodbye to Your Rights: Why the Bipartisan Push for Drug Courts Is Overrated, 
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drug courts adopt this approach of reserving jail for multiple positive 
urinalysis results,355 while others may send a participant to jail even for the 
first positive urine test.356 
Ostensibly, these sanctions are premised on the principle that the 
individual can conform their conduct to the behavioral requirements of the 
drug court program, including abstinence from alcohol and drugs. The failure 
to adhere to these requirements thus may be met with punitive 
consequences—even though the program participant has an addiction to drugs 
and/or alcohol. It is unclear why individuals with drug or alcohol disease may 
be held responsible for their actions and deemed appropriate subjects of 
punishment in the specialized drug court context but not in the criminal 
justice system overall. 
Addiction Cannot Be Categorically Examined. How an individual with an 
addiction can effectively address their addiction depends on the nature and 
circumstances of the individual. As the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
notes, “[n]o single treatment is appropriate for everyone.” 357  Treatment 
programs and twelve-step fellowship programs likewise stress that no person’s 
treatment or recovery will be identical.358 
The disability context similarly emphasizes the need to appraise the 
specific situation facing the individual when making a disability 
determination. Consider a debate that arose between two circuits as to 
whether an individual who achieves good grades nonetheless can be an 
individual with a learning disability. On one hand, the Second Circuit held 
that the relevant question in determining whether a student has a cognizable 
 
REASON (Aug. 17, 2012, 10:30 AM), https://reason.com/2012/08/17/want-to-go-to-drug-court-say-
goodbye-to/ [https://perma.cc/SWB5-597J] (“In every [drug] court that receives federal funding, jail 
is a mandatory penalty.”).  
 355. E.g., PALM BEACH CNTY. DRUG CT. OFF., DRUG COURT TABLE OF SANCTIONS 
(assigning a twenty-four-hour jail sanction to a second positive urinalysis result).  
 356. E.g., BLUE EARTH CNTY. ADULT HYBRID DRUG CT., PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 24 (“If 
you have a positive test in any drug court phase, the judge, based on recommendations from the drug 
court team, will apply immediate sanctions including time in jail to help you stop your drug using 
behavior.”); MONTGOMERY CNTY. ADULT DRUG CT. INTERVENTION TRACK, PARTICIPANT 
HANDBOOK 33 (including jail time in the various sanctions available to courts after a single positive 
urinalysis result).  
 357. Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 4; see also id. (“Treatment varies depending on 
the type of drug and the characteristics of the patients. Matching treatment settings, interventions, 
and services to an individual’s particular problems and needs is critical to his or her ultimate success 
in returning to productive functioning in the family, workplace, and society.”). 
 358. See, e.g., THE BIG BOOK, supra note 325, at xxv (2009) (“I personally know scores of cases 
who were of the type with whom other methods had failed completely.”); Our Treatment Philosophy, 
CARON, https://www.caron.org/proven-treatment/treatment-philosophy [https://perma.cc/XP95-
V8AY] (“We tailor clinically proven addiction treatment plans to each patient and family member.”); 
Where Can I Get the Best Addiction Treatment Programs in MD?, ASHLEY ADDICTION TREATMENT, 
https://www.ashleytreatment.org/addiction-treatment/ [https://perma.cc/XBL7-VNUV] (“Every 
individual’s road to addiction is unique.”). 
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learning disability is the “condition[], manner, or duration” of the purported 
limitation, as regulations prescribe.359 Under this interpretation, a student who 
strains to earn good grades because of a limitation may be qualified as an 
individual with a disability notwithstanding the grades themselves. In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that a student who performed well 
academically, under the same circumstances as other students, simply could 
not be an individual with a disability: “[The plaintiff’s] claim to be ‘disabled’ 
was contradicted by his ability to achieve academic success, and to do so 
without special accommodations.”360 
The Fourth Circuit, in the addiction context, seemed to side with the 
Ninth Circuit, categorically equating addiction with an absence of choice 
much like categorically equating academic achievement with an absence of a 
disability. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit was satisfied with a blanket statement 
that the individuals possess an addiction, declining to engage in an 
individualized inquiry as to the nature of the individual’s addiction as it 
relates to their conduct.361 
In the disability context, Congress has expressly rejected a categorical 
approach in which an individual would be considered an individual with a 
disability on the basis of label or diagnosis alone. More specifically, Congress 
has made clear that having a diagnosed impairment will not automatically 
satisfy the definition of having a disability.362 Instead, Congress emphasized 
that the conditions, manner, and duration under which the individual lives are 
what matter for purposes of disability determinations.363 
While Congress has codified the individualized approach taken by the 
Second Circuit in the learning disability context, it has yet to do so with the 
Fourth Circuit’s categorical approach in the addiction context. The diverse 
presentations of addiction, the unique paths to recovery, and the courts’ 
related insistence on individualized assessments of physical and mental 
impairments, all undermine this categorical approach. Professors Richard 
Holton and Kent Berridge counsel that, “We should . . . not be thinking of 
addictive desires as things that are impossible to resist, but as things that are 
 
 359. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 360. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005); see also id. (“Most 
notably, Wong completed the first two years of the medical school program, the academic courses, on 
a normal schedule, with a grade point average slightly above a ‘B,’ and he passed the required national 
board examination at that point, both without the benefit of any special accommodations.”).  
 361. See Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 281–84 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).  
 362. See 35 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1)(v) (2020). 
 363. See Id. § 35.108(d)(3).  
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very difficult to resist.”364 The courts should probe the nature of that difficulty 
on an individual basis. 
This discussion suggests that various factors—the lucid intervals during 
which an individual with an addiction may be aware of their addiction and the 
adverse consequences of addictive addiction, the moral and social 
responsibility to mitigate the harms stemming from the addiction, and viable 
options to fulfill that responsibility—support the conclusion that an individual 
with an addiction may be capable of the choice necessary for criminal liability 
to attach. This determination is further bolstered by the distinction between 
addiction and involuntariness, and the impropriety of categorically assessing 
addiction.  
C. Addiction and the Purposes of Punishment 
The argument that an individual with alcohol or drug disease is amenable 
to punishment must be consistent with the underlying purposes of 
punishment. These purposes supply the theoretical and principled foundation 
for criminal law. Each of the traditional justifications for the imposition of 
punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
support the application of general criminal liability to an individual with drug 
or alcohol disease.365 
First, retributive theory authorizes the imposition of punishment on the 
individual with alcohol or drug disease. Retribution provides that an 
individual deserves punishment because they are morally responsible for 
inflicting harm or risk of harm on society.366 To a retributivist, the individual 
is a moral agent capable of choice and, if the individual decides to violate the 
law, society must impose consequences on the individual for that choice.367 
Retribution thus pays respect to the moral agency of the individual and 
completes the bargain that the social contract sets forth: if you break the law, 
you are owed punishment.368 
An individual with diminished capacity is less deserving of punishment 
in a retributivist system.369 From this lens, it may be tempting to suggest that 
 
 364. Richard Holton & Kent Berridge, Compulsion and Choice in Addiction, in ADDICTION AND 
CHOICE: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 153, 155 (Nick Heather & Gabriel Segal eds., 2017). 
 365. See Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 422–23 (D.C. 1975). 
 366. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2d ed. 1968) (defining 
retribution as “the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty”). 
 367. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 677–78 (2015). 
 368. Id. (“[U]nder a retributivist framework, the offender is paying a ‘debt’ owed to society for 
the improper ‘benefits and burdens’ that he or she received from or imposed on others, which, when 
paid, restores an equilibrium within society.”). 
 369. See id. at 708 (“Our criminal law . . . does not . . . punish those who cannot make moral 
choices for themselves, such as children, the intellectually disabled, or the insane. These individuals 
are considered categorically ineligible for criminal sanction because they cannot be ‘blameworthy in 
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an individual with an alcohol or drug disease is less deserving of punishment 
because their disease exerts downward pressure on their ability to exercise free 
will and make a meaningfully voluntary choice as to whether to drink or 
use.370 But, as noted above, the person’s conscious awareness of the disease, 
and an unwillingness to address the manifestations of the disease, changes the 
theoretical dynamic: one is culpable for what one deliberately ignores or fails 
to sufficiently address.371 In this sense, punishing the individual with alcohol 
or drug disease would be consistent with retributive principles. 
Second, as Justice Breyer put it, deterrence attempts to ensure, through 
punishment, that “crime does not and will not pay.”372 An individual with an 
alcohol or drug disease may be deterred insofar as they are consciously aware 
of their actions. Conscious awareness enables a possible weighing of 
competing considerations, including any probability of detection and 
punishment. 
Third, incapacitation offers the strongest basis for punishment of an 
individual with an alcohol or drug disease. Incapacitation is premised on the 
notion that punishment should be designed to physically separate the 
wrongdoer from others, thus limiting their ability to engage in further harmful 
actions.373 Blackstone wrote that incapacitation “depriv[es] the party injuring 
of the power to do future mischief.”374 Here, incapacitation would support the 
imposition of punishment even as to involuntary acts because the individual is 
incapable of self-regulation and has revealed an inability to keep themselves 
within the bounds of the law. Judge Posner observed, for example, that an 
individual suffering from a condition warrants a “heavier sentence” under 
 
mind’; they lack the requisite mental capacity to meaningfully choose between good and evil.” 
(quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952))). 
 370. See Alfred Blumstein, The Search for the Elusive Common “Principle”, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 43, 
47 (1988) (“[T]ake two convicted robbers, one of whom is found to be a heavy user of drugs and the 
other who is not. In desert terms, the drug-user deserves a lesser sentence because the drugs had 
affected his behavior, leaving him with diminished capacity. Many would thus adjudge him less 
blameworthy than a non-drug-abusing robber.”). 
 371. See Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, A Sober Assessment of the Link Between Substance 
Abuse and Crime — Eliminating Drug and Alcohol Use from the Sentencing Calculus, 56 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 243, 278 (2016) (“[A]ddiction . . . may be less mitigating . . . where the defendant has had 
numerous opportunities for treatment and has either declined drug treatment or failed to 
meaningfully attempt to complete drug treatment.” (quoting United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F. 
Supp. 3d 1166, 1175 (N.D. Iowa 2014))). 
 372. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 47 (1998). 
 373. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment 
does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from 
committing additional crimes in the outside world.”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s 
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 989 (1985) (“Proponents of the incapacitation approach believe that 
the best way to prevent a particular offender from committing future crimes is to remove him from 
society.”). 
 374. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11–12. 
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incapacitation principles because that sentence “will reduce his lifetime 
criminal activity by incapacitating him for a longer time than if he received a 
lighter sentence.”375 Similarly, the individual who claims that their drinking or 
using is compelled by disease and beyond their control would be making a 
classic case for punishment under incapacitation principles: a person who 
cannot stop crossing the line must be separated from society so as to protect 
that society, irrespective of the reasons for the lack of control. 
Finally, the rehabilitative theory of punishment also strongly justifies the 
imposition of punishment on an individual with alcohol or drug disease. The 
rehabilitative theory posits that punishment is appropriate to reform or 
correct the individual’s behavior.376 This personal growth and development 
inures not only to the benefit of the individual but also to the society to which 
they will return, as the individual will pose less danger to society and will be 
more likely to make positive contributions to their community.377 
Today, rehabilitation is most associated with treatment and formal 
programs calculated to enhance the personal and professional capacities of the 
individual. This programmatic support may cover alcohol and substance abuse 
disorders, co-occurring mental health disorders, anger management, skills 
development, vocational training, and educational programs.378 An individual 
with alcohol or drug disease is an appropriate subject of punishment under the 
rehabilitative purpose of punishment because punishment is an opportunity 
for the disease to be treated and its effects to be mitigated. Drug courts 
demonstrate this principle in action.379 Data also shows that treatment can be 
an effective means to address the disease and reduce recidivism.380 
In short, the purposes of punishment do not undermine the conclusion 
that criminal punishment may be imposed on an individual with an alcohol or 
drug disease. Indeed, each purpose, especially incapacitation and 
rehabilitation, provides support for the imposition of such punishment. 
 
 375. United States v. Garthus, 652 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 376. United States v. Cole, 622 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 377. Sidhu, supra note 367, at 679. 
 378. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 5 (“Effective treatment attends to multiple 
needs of the individual, not just his or her drug abuse. To be effective, treatment must address the 
individual’s drug abuse and any associated medical, psychological, social, vocational, and legal 
problems. It is also important that treatment be appropriate to the individual’s age, gender, ethnicity, 
and culture.”). 
 379. See supra notes 353–56 and accompanying text. 
 380. See Ethan G. Kalett, Note, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (Of Prison): An Evaluation of “Anonymous 
Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 139 (1996) (“Yet most studies show that 
while traditional parole/probation has failed to decrease recidivism in addicted offenders, placing 
such offenders in drug and alcohol treatment programs does decrease recidivism.”); see also id. at 149 
(“A.A. itself claims to have lowered recidivism among criminal alcoholics by 60% . . . .”). 
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D. Evidence of Choice 
The prior sections suggest that the status-conduct distinction is 
inadequate because it fails to require an individual with an addiction to show, 
as required by Justice White’s controlling opinion, that the disease of 
addiction actually precluded compliance with the law. At the same time, the 
alternative approach championed by the Fourth Circuit, which accepted the 
diagnosis of an addiction as sufficient proof of involuntariness, is also flawed. 
It is clear as a medical and clinical matter, not to mention from parallel legal 
contexts, that a diagnosis is not an automatic or categorical bar to seeking and 
obtaining help. It also is clear from the previous discussion that an individual 
with an addiction who violates the law is a proper subject of criminal 
punishment, even if the unlawful act is symptomatic of the disease. This 
section describes how the Fourth Circuit should have engaged in an 
individualized inquiry to determine voluntariness in the case before it. 
Showing of Involuntariness. The question left unanswered by Justice 
White’s concurring opinion and by the Fourth Circuit opinion is: What would 
it take for an individual with an addiction to demonstrate that their actions 
were involuntary for purposes of criminal law? Based on the foregoing 
discussion, several factors emerge that may help courts determine whether 
such conduct is involuntary. 
First, an individual who drinks or uses drugs may have a conscious 
awareness, between periods of consumption or even during periods of 
consumption, that drinking or using is problematic for them. 381  These 
moments of awareness serve as opportunities to address the disease and its 
manifestations.382 A court seeking to determine whether an individual with 
drug or alcohol disease should be held criminally liable for a prohibited act 
should therefore ask whether any such opportunities, or “lucid intervals,” 
existed. If they did, and the individual still did not take meaningful, ongoing 
action, the responsibility for the uncorrected manifestation of the disease may 
be attributed to the individual; the decision to forgo help is itself a choice.383 
Second, even if the individual has the opportunity to seek help, actually 
obtaining help may be a different story. An individual wanting to address 
their addiction to drugs or alcohol generally has options, including calling 
emergency services and detoxifying or receiving other treatment in a hospital 
setting. But it also may be possible that, although the individual has made 
meaningful efforts to seek treatment, treatment is not yet feasible. Some 
facilities may be at capacity or may have waiting lists for admission, 
effectively precluding the individual from obtaining help notwithstanding 
 
 381. See supra notes 321–22 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text. 
 383. See supra notes 333–37 and accompanying text. 
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their demonstrated desire to address their addiction.384 As with the Ninth 
Circuit case in which homeless individuals avoided criminal liability because 
area homeless shelters were full,385 a court exploring whether an individual 
with an addiction may be held criminally responsible should examine both the 
affirmative efforts made by the individual to receive help and the availability 
of any appropriate help. 
Third, even if the individual is unable to receive help, despite the 
reasonable pursuit of it, the absence of any immediately accessible treatment 
opportunities is not a license to drink or use. Since addiction is not 
monolithic, it presents itself differently for different people, so a court should 
look into the conditions during any period in which help was sought but could 
not be secured. 
For example, an individual who drinks or uses in this interval on account 
of averting severe withdrawal symptoms may be able to make a stronger 
argument of involuntariness than a person who used without withdrawal 
symptoms looming over their head.386 Individuals with drug or alcohol disease 
may hunt for their drug of choice specifically to avoid or at least delay 
withdrawal symptoms.387 The importance of withdrawal in the context of 
criminal law finds support in existing law. In both Robinson and Powell, the 
Supreme Court pointed out that neither defendant was drinking alcohol to 
address actual or imminent withdrawal symptoms.388 In Powell, the plurality 
additionally suggested that the loss of control or volition over drinking might 
occur when the individual drinks alcohol in response to withdrawal.389 
 
 384. See Cristina Redko, Richard C. Rapp & Robert G. Carlson, Waiting Time as a Barrier to 
Treatment Entry: Perceptions of Substance Users, 36 J. DRUG ISSUES 831, 837–38, 841–42 (2006); 
Stacey C. Sigmon, Taylor A. Ochalek, Andrew C. Meyer, Bryce Hruska, Sarah H. Heil, Gary J. 
Badger, Gail Rose, John R. Brooklyn, Robert P. Schwartz, Brent A. Moore & Stephen T. Higgins, 
Correspondence, Interim Buprenorphine vs. Waiting List for Opioid Dependence, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2504, 2504 (2016) (“Despite the demonstrated efficacy of maintaining abstinence by treating patients 
with opioid agonists, patients can remain on clinic waiting lists for months . . . .”). 
 385. See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
920 F.3d 584 (2019). 
 386. A number of excellent articles describe the “sheer hell” that is withdrawal. See, e.g., 
O’Malley, supra note 91; Brian Rinker, What “Dope Sick” Really Feels Like, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Feb. 
8, 2019), https://californiahealthline.org/news/what-dope-sick-really-feels-like/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VPE4-JARY]; Matthew Rozsa, Opioid Addicts on How They Got Addicted, SALON (May 24, 2019, 
10:00 P.M.), https://www.salon.com/2019/05/24/opioid-addicts-on-how-they-got-addicted [https:// 
perma.cc/G72K-98SF]. 
 387. Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80, at 24 (noting that treatment designed to reduce 
withdrawal symptoms “makes it easier to stop the drug use”). 
 388. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 525 (1968) (plurality opinion); Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 662 (1962). 
 389. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 525 (“[I]t cannot accurately be said that a person is truly unable to 
abstain from drinking unless he is suffering the physical symptoms of withdrawal.”); see also L.S. Tao, 
Alcoholism as a Defense to Crime, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 68, 77 (1969) (suggesting that an 
individual with alcoholism may not avoid criminal responsibility if “he retains mastery over his 
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These three nonexhaustive factors—awareness and attendant action, 
availability of help, and nature of the addiction—should help guide a court’s 
particular, individualized inquiry as to whether the individual possesses the 
culpability sufficient for criminal liability to be appropriate. The Fourth 
Circuit did not engage in this analysis, categorically equating the label or 
diagnosis of addiction with involuntariness.390 
To be sure, the case rose to the Fourth Circuit on a motion to dismiss 
and, on such a motion, a court is to accept the factual allegations of the 
nonmovant as true. 391  But conclusory allegations—that an individual is 
compelled to drink on account of the disease of addiction—are insufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.392 The complaint must contain factual support 
enabling the court to infer that the allegations are plausible.393 
Application. Here, the Fourth Circuit accepted the five plaintiffs’ bare 
conclusions that they were compelled to drink, without digging deeper as an 
evidentiary approach would require and as a sufficient analysis of a motion to 
dismiss does require. A proper examination of the complaint indicates that 
one plaintiff would survive the motion, while four would fall short. 
The complaint states that the five plaintiffs “suffer from alcohol use 
disorder,” which is a “disease,” and that the plaintiffs “have a profound drive 
or craving to use alcohol, which is a compulsive or non-volitional aspect of 
addiction.”394 This blanket statement is inadequate to surpass a motion to 
dismiss as it equates the disease itself with compulsion, restates a legal 
conclusion that any drinking by an individual with the disease is 
nonvolitional, does not indicate that the individuals lacked any lucid intervals, 
and does not indicate whether the plaintiffs lacked meaningful options to 
respond to their addiction. An individualized inquiry under the evidentiary 
model would further probe each of the plaintiffs’ specific conditions and 
circumstances. 
The complaint notes that the named plaintiff, Cary Hendrick, has been 
in treatment programs, has not been able to stay sober, and has withdrawal 
symptoms without alcohol.395 Previous unsuccessful efforts at mitigation do 
not, however, entitle the individual to forgo future efforts. Indeed, treatment 
 
course of behavior insofar as he could stop drinking without triggering these serious physical 
withdrawal symptoms”). 
 390. See Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
 391. Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868, 875–76 (W.D. Va. 2017), vacated sub nom., 
Manning, 930 F.3d at 264. 
 392. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (“It is the conclusory nature of [a plaintiff’s] 
allegations . . . that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”). 
 393. See id. at 678–80. 
 394. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 23–25, Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 
(No. 7:16-CV-0095) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 395. Id. ¶¶ 46–47. 
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programs are not designed to be the be-all-end-all; they are the training 
wheels that are designed to empower the individual to maintain sobriety 
through their own developed support system. 396  Moreover, it is not 
uncommon for individuals to receive treatment multiple times before 
treatment sticks or clicks.397 In addition, individuals may enter treatment at 
one level, only to require more acute care. 398  A person with a visual 
impairment would be expected to continue finding corrective lenses that were 
effective rather than proceeding through life blind, consequences be damned. 
Critically, the complaint does not reveal that Hendrick lost awareness of the 
manifestations of his disease, was deprived of any opportunities to receive 
additional or higher levels of care, or was compelled to use while awaiting 
access to appropriate care. 399  If anything, the complaint describes an 
individual who tried treatment and tried no more.400 Recovery only “works if 
you work it,”401 or put forth persistent and ongoing corrective efforts. The 
same flaws and shortcomings in Hendrick’s allegations also appear for the 
other plaintiffs.402 
The only plaintiff that may satisfy a motion to dismiss under the 
evidentiary model is Ryan Williams. The complaint alleges that he suffers 
withdrawal symptoms if he does not consume alcohol. 403 This allegation, 
accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, would cut in favor of a finding 
of involuntary use of alcohol. Whether this fact holds up can and should be 
assessed at a later phase of the case. 
Whether an individual with addiction to drugs or alcohol is a proper 
subject of criminal punishment requires a fact-based inquiry. This section 
demonstrates—through the application of the evidentiary model to Manning—
 
 396. See Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 9.  
 397. See Drugs, Brains, and Behavior, supra note 80, at 23 (“When a person recovering from an 
addiction relapses, it indicates that the person needs to speak with their doctor to resume treatment, 
modify it, or try another treatment.”); Principles of Drug Addiction, supra note 108, at 10 (“Successful 
treatment for addiction typically requires continual evaluation and modification as appropriate, 
similar to the approach taken for other chronic diseases.”). 
 398. See Leslie C. Morey, Patient Placement Criteria: Linking Typologies to Managed Care, 20 
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RSCH. WORLD 36, 39 (1996). 
 399. The complaint states that he suffers from seizures if he does not have access to alcohol, but 
also adds that he takes medication to control the seizures. Complaint, supra note 394, ¶ 47. 
 400. See Complaint, supra note 394, ¶ 46. 
 401. See Recovery Slogans, 12STEP.ORG, https://www.12step.org/references/commonly-used/ 
recovery-slogans/ [https://perma.cc/5PD5-9QHG]. 
 402. See Complaint, supra note 394, ¶¶ 53, 59 (Bryan Manning); id. ¶¶ 66, 72 (Ryan Williams); 
id. ¶ 79 (Richard Deckerhoff); id. ¶¶ 93, 97 (Richard Eugene Walls). To be sure, it seems that some 
of the plaintiffs may have been arrested without having any alcohol in their system, see. id. ¶ 52 
(noting that Manning was arrested due to “smelling like alcohol”); id. ¶¶ 77, 92 (asserting that Mr. 
Walls was arrested due to “empty beer cans” being nearby), which would seem to run afoul of 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 403. Complaint, supra note 394, ¶ 73. The named plaintiff also references withdrawal symptoms, 
id. ¶ 47, but also concedes that the symptoms are managed with medication, id. 
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that the proposed model is workable, and therefore has the hallmarks of a 
sound and durable legal regime. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article aims to update the response to the fundamental question of 
whether an individual who possesses an alcohol or substance use disorder may 
face criminal liability for conduct that is symptomatic of that disorder. A 
renewed understanding of the relationship between criminal law and addiction 
is required for several reasons, including the evolution of social attitudes and 
scientific knowledge respecting addiction, and a crisis within the federal 
circuit court of appeals on the applicability of criminal liability to conduct 
symptomatic of addiction. 
This Article argues that the majority approach taken by the federal 
appellate courts wrongly asks only whether the criminal offense contains an 
actus reus and that the Fourth Circuit approach wrongly immunizes the 
individual with an addiction from criminal liability, with both regimes staking 
out categorical rules that fail to probe the individualized nature of addiction. 
An individualized inquiry—guided by considerations of conscious awareness, 
practical opportunities to receive help, and the nature of the addiction—would 
properly reflect the Supreme Court’s guideposts in this field, match 
Congress’s determinations in the disability space, and align with the fact that 
addiction is not a monolithic disease but one whose presentations and related 
experiences are different for each afflicted person. Moreover, and critically, an 
individualized inquiry would be consistent with the recognition—supported 
by case law, scientific information, addiction treatment programs, and twelve-
step fellowship literature—that an individual with the disease of addiction 
generally is capable of exercising choice and that choice is an essential 
predicate to criminal punishment. As such, the bar to show involuntariness is 
high, and thus addiction may function as a limited and narrow shield to 
criminal liability. 
This Article seeks to assist courts, litigants, and the public by providing a 
descriptive survey of the relationship between criminal law and addiction and 
by suggesting how that relationship may be refined to best pay tribute both to 
current knowledge on the subject and to core principles of criminal 
responsibility. 
